Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

Barry, Christian; Tomlin, Patrick

doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1198198

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…So far I have relied on the intuition that knowing our moral obligations determinately makes one better off. However, according to some philosophers, even if we do not know the outcomes of our actions determinately, or even the various possible ways of valuing possible outcomes, we can still calculate our moral meta-obligations (Lockhart 2000;Zimmerman 2008, 38;Barry and Tomlin 2016;Lazar 2018). The underlying strategy for determining our meta-obligations is to consider every plausible valuation of different possible actions (the possible obligations about which we are uncertain), and then use a meta-principle to calculate one's unique meta-obligation given these possible valuations.…”

Section: Carlamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ethics of Medical Data Donation

Krutzinna¹,

Floridi²

2019

Philosophical Studies Series

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adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

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Section: Carlamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ethics of Medical Data Donation

Krutzinna¹,

Floridi²

2019

Philosophical Studies Series

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“…So far I have relied on the intuition that knowing our moral obligations determinately makes one better off. However, according to some philosophers, even if we do not know the outcomes of our actions determinately, or even the various possible ways of valuing possible outcomes, we can still calculate our moral meta-obligations (Lockhart 2000;Zimmerman 2008, 38;Barry & Tomlin 2016;Lazar 2018). The underlying strategy for determining our meta-obligations is to consider every plausible valuation of different possible actions (the possible obligations about which we are uncertain), and then use a meta-principle to calculate one's unique metaobligation given these possible valuations.…”

Section: B Interests In Knowing Our Own Obligationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ethics of Uncertainty for Data Subjects

Nickel

2019

SSRN Journal

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Modern health data practices come with many practical uncertainties. In this paper I argue that data subjects' trust in the institutions and organizations that control their data, and their ability to know their own moral obligations in relation to their data, are undermined by significant uncertainties regarding the what, how, and who of mass data collection and analysis. I conclude by considering how proposals for managing situations of high uncertainty might be applied to this problem. These emphasize increasing organizational flexibility, knowledge, and capacity, and reducing hazard.

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“…that of MacAskill (2016a)] begin with the normative theories in all their diversity; work through problems of intertheoretic comparability; and then try to define subjective choiceworthiness with no more structure than necessary. On some accounts, this minimal structure allows only for a binary classification of acts into the "permissible" and the "impermissible" [as recommended, for instance, by Barry and Tomlin (2016)]. The above approach, by contrast, begins by assuming that subjective choiceworthiness is a single cardinal scale, and it characterizes k-metachoiceworthiness claims, and the k-metatheories that make them, in terms of the subjective choiceworthinesses that they would induce if they were known.…”

Section: The Relationship Of K-metachoiceworthiness To Subjective Chomentioning

confidence: 99%

Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty

Trammell

2019

Synthese

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When we are faced with a choice among acts, but are uncertain about the true state of the world, we may be uncertain about the acts' "choiceworthiness". Decision theories guide our choice by making normative claims about how we should respond to this uncertainty. If we are unsure which decision theory is correct, however, we may remain unsure of what we ought to do. Given this decision-theoretic uncertainty, metatheories attempt to resolve the conflicts between our decision theories…but we may be unsure which meta-theory is correct as well. This reasoning can launch a regress of ever-higher-order uncertainty, which may leave one forever uncertain about what one ought to do. There is, fortunately, a class of circumstances under which this regress is not a problem. If one holds a cardinal understanding of subjective choiceworthiness, and accepts certain other criteria (which are too weak to specify any particular decision theory), one's hierarchy of metanormative uncertainty ultimately converges to precise definitions of "subjective choiceworthiness" for any finite set of acts. If one allows the metanormative regress to extend to the transfinite ordinals, the convergence criteria can be weakened further. Finally, the structure of these results applies straightforwardly not just to decision-theoretic uncertainty, but also to other varieties of normative uncertainty, such as moral uncertainty. Keywords Decision theory • Moral uncertainty • Normative uncertainty • Uncertaintism My thanks to Anubav Vasudevan, Christian Tarsney, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are my own.

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Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

Cited by 15 publications

References 10 publications

The Ethics of Medical Data Donation

The Ethics of Medical Data Donation

The Ethics of Uncertainty for Data Subjects

Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty

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