Moral Testimony under Oppression

Dular, Nicole

doi:10.1111/josp.12183

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Perhaps people are less reliable sources of moral testimony because they are more likely to lie or mislead when it comes to moral matters . Perhaps, within unjust social structures, deference to the apparently reliable sources could lead to a systematically distorted moral belief (and perpetuating the unjust social hierarchies) (Dular, ). Perhaps moral realism is false and some form of constructivism, relativism, subjectivism, noncognitivism, or similar is true and either of those seems potentially able to provide some explanation (Mcgrath, ).…”

Section: Testimony and Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why don't we trust moral testimony?

Andow

2019

Mind & Language

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Is there a problem with believing based on moral testimony? The intuition that there is a problem is a starting point for much research on moral testimony. To arbitrate between various attempts to account for intuitions about moral testimony, we need to know the exact nature of those intuitions. The current study investigates this empirically. The study confirms an asymmetry in the way we think about testimony about moral and descriptive matters and explores the extent to which this asymmetry is explained by different metaphysical beliefs about the relevant domains, or beliefs about the relative background levels of deception or disagreement.

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Section: Testimony and Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why don't we trust moral testimony?

Andow

2019

Mind & Language

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“…Winner of 23 Grand Slam singles titles, she'd been playing tennis since age 1 Cf. discussion in, e.g., Dular (2017), Jones (2012), and Hazlett (2017, who each detail ways in which being a member of an oppressed group can already cause one to feel unconfident or uncertain about many of one's beliefs.…”

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confidence: 99%

Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account

Callahan

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In this paper I propose a new account of the virtue of intellectual humility (henceforth usually abbreviated IH): IH is freedom, in one's thinking, from prideful distraction by one's intellectual ego. The person with IH enjoys a certain relative ability to think clearly or focus; her intellectual energies are not often diverted by thoughts about her own status or intellectual abilities, and her thinking does not suffer distortion from the need to validate her own beliefs, as such. I call this the no-distraction account of IH.The no-distraction account, I'll suggest, is broadly attractive. It does a plausible job of classifying cases of intellectual (non) humility and echoes longstanding thought from various traditions about the value of humility. It also achieves a particular -potentially controversial but by my lights very important and, indeed, underappreciated -desideratum on accounts of IH: the desideratum of inclusivity. That is, it casts IH as a trait that would be valuable and appropriate in any context, including in contexts of oppression and marginalization. This is not an easy desideratum to achieve. One might initially be tempted to think that IH requires, e.g., regularly calling to mind one's intellectual limitations, or a general willingness to defer to other people, or a relatively low or moderate confidence in one's own opinions. But people in contexts of oppression and marginalization are often poorly served by all of those things. What we might naturally take to be required by IH would be inappropriate, dangerous, and detrimental in their lives. 1 Indeed, these forms of (by my lights) pseudo-IH would be dangerous or inappropriate even in some cases where an individual is -in some respects -highly privileged. Consider the much-publicized story of Serena Williams's first postpartum experience, which has been taken to highlight the struggle of Black mothers to be heard and taken seriously within the healthcare system (even when they are also famous athletes!):Serena Williams knew her body well enough to listen when it told her something was wrong. Winner of 23 Grand Slam singles titles, she'd been playing tennis since age 1 Cf. discussion in, e.g., Dular (2017), Jones (2012), and Hazlett (2017, who each detail ways in which being a member of an oppressed group can already cause one to feel unconfident or uncertain about many of one's beliefs.

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Standpoint moral epistemology: the epistemic advantage thesis

Dular

2023

Philos Stud

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Moral Testimony under Oppression

Cited by 4 publications

References 38 publications

Why don't we trust moral testimony?

Why don't we trust moral testimony?

Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account

Standpoint moral epistemology: the epistemic advantage thesis

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