Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?

Abstract

Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting two models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion.

Ethical issues when modelling brain disorders innon-human primates

“…If NHPs have enough in common with humans to be useful model organisms, they likely occupy a level of moral status that would obligate us to protect them from being used in certain ways ii 9–11. According to what’s been called the ‘commonsense’ view of animals’ moral status articulated best by DeGrazia, moral status varies with organisms’ capacities, for example, sentience, consciousness, self-awareness, moral agency, participation in meaningful relationships, language and so on 12. Different capacities generate morally weightier interests.…”

Consciousness and Moral Status

“…This latter point has been made by others (e.g., Rachels 2004 ;DeGrazia 2008 ;Sachs 2011 ). It is important enough to underline.…”

Chimeras intended for human gamete production: an ethical alternative?

“…To defend the proposition that human gametes have intrinsic value is to assert that they have interests, that we have obligations towards them, and that the obligations we have towards them are based, at least partly, on their interests (DeGrazia, 2008). This position is implausible.…”