Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke

Mattern, Ruth

doi:10.2307/2184862

Cited by 60 publications

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“…These include Antonia LoLordo ( and ), Udo Thiel ( and ), William Uzgalis (), Ruth Mattern (), and arguably Galen Strawson () though this interpretation can be traced back to Edmund Law ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Gordon‐Roth¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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The importance of John Locke's discussion of persons is undeniable. Locke never explicitly tells us whether he thinks persons are substances or modes, however. We are thus left in the dark about a fundamental aspect of Locke's view. Many commentators have recently claimed that Lockean persons are modes. In this paper I swim against the current tide in the secondary literature and argue that Lockean persons are substances. Specifically I argue that what Locke says about substance, power, and agency commits him to the claim that persons are substances. I consider the passages mode interpreters cite and show why these passages do not imply that Lockean persons are modes. I also respond to two objections anyone who thinks Lockean persons are substances must address. I show that a substance reading of Locke on persons can be sympathetic and viable. I contend that with a clearer understanding of the ontological status of Lockean persons we can gain a firmer grasp of what Locke's picture of persons looks like. Finally, once we are armed with a better understanding of Locke on substance, mode, and personhood, we can pave the way toward a more nuanced description of the early modern debate over personal identity.

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confidence: 99%

Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Gordon‐Roth¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…John Locke's ideas about same life and the atomic sameness of living things in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding seem also to question the possibility of the resurrection of the soul in a different body, thus essentially dismissing the importance soul/body duality (cf. Jolley 2015;Strawson 2011;Stewart 2000;Uzgalis 1990Uzgalis , 1988Uzgalis , 2007Yolton 1956Yolton , 1969Yolton , 1970Yolton , 1984aYolton , 1984bYolton , 1990Locke & Yolton 1977;LoLordo 2010LoLordo , 2012Mattern 1980;Forstrom 2010). Nimbalkar 2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

Is Christianity a Hoax?

Mboti¹

2017

Preprint

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Can a thing be what it is not? Can a thing be where it is not, and not be where it is? Can God not be God? Can God afford to be a dununu? In this article, I unveil the “Jesus Paradox”, and try to solve it using a Biblically derived principle. I propose that Christianity is a hoax, because it breaks the “stupidity principle” or the dununu principle. The stupidity principle is the fact that a sovereign God cannot do stupid things. Christianity, though, bears all the marks of a very deep stupidity. Any God who seems to make provision for His own death, or who admits that He once died, seems to me to be a hopelessly stupid God. The Jesus paradox arises because of what seems to be a unique though simple discovery: that there is, in fact, one thing that God cannot do. God cannot afford not to be God. That is, God cannot die. The paradox which traps Jesus is that He needs to die in order to show that He is God, but by dying He forfeits being God. Could Jesus die? Can He die? Can God afford to die? In this theoretical article I draw some provisional notes around the problem. In the end, I solve the Jesus paradox through the dununu principle. Because God cannot die, resurrection and Christianity are in fact irrelevant.

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“…2 See Edmund Law (1769). 3 Other authors who argue that Locke's person is a mode include Ruth Mattern (1980) and William Uzgalis (1990).…”

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confidence: 99%

Locke's Person is a Relation

Simendic¹

2015

LockeStud

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John Locke added a chapter called ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694) [hereafter E or Essay] in which he presented a revolutionary account of persons and personal identity. Chapter II.xxvii proved to be an immensely important contribution to the philosophical scholarship of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and remains the focus of a substantial and growing body of commentary. Within the abundant literature on Locke’s views on personhood, a number of contemporary accounts endeavour to answer a seemingly simple question— what is Locke’s person? Locke gives no explicit answer but offers three possibilities. ‘Complex ideas’, Locke writes, ‘may be all reduced under these three Heads’ (E, II.xxi.3) and these three are: modes, substances and relations.

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Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke

Cited by 60 publications

References 0 publications

Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Is Christianity a Hoax?

Locke's Person is a Relation

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