Moral Reasons Not to Posit Extended Cognitive Systems: a Reply to Farina and Lavazza

Cassinadri, Guido

doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00560-0

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…We think that the moral desirability or undesirability of the implications of the two views (EMB/EXT) cannot be derived merely and directly from the causal/constitutive cognitive distinction, but rather from the combination between this distinction and a specific moral framework which is implicitly assumed. This in line with Cassinadri's (2022) general critique of the EXT-MN, according to which, if we consider the specific arguments in favour of the EXT moral narrative proposed so far, it becomes clear that the supposed relevant moral differences and implications attributed to the two views are not the result of the two views taken per se, but rather are the result of further moral assumptions and frameworks that are used in combination with EMB and EXT. 9 Therefore, in Sect.…”

Section: The Cognitive Diminishment Argumentsupporting

confidence: 78%

“…Thus, it seems to us that appealing to students' self-reports (Young & Specht, 2010;2011) as well as the entire AAC are forms of philosophical abstraction and conceptual exploitation (or at least instrumental use) of cognitive disability (Carlson, 2009;Timpe, 2019, p. 160). 17 In this treatment we appeal to the values of inclusiveness and progressiveness as intended in Cassinadri (2022); Farina and Lavazza (2022a). The former is defined as "vastness and a plurality of ends and ways of flourishing" and the "autonomy of people in their choices", while the latter is defined in terms of accepting positive change in new directions (Farina & Lavazza, 2022a, p. 14).…”

Section: Final Critiques and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cassinadri (2022) criticised the argument from better protection, the argument from legitimate interventions, the argument from extended agency and autonomy and the argument from better treatment, arguing that each of them present EXT as morally preferable than EMB not for reasons inherent to the two frameworks taken per se, but rather by virtue of specific moral assumptions.10 As we will see in the next section, this assumption ignores the normative relevance in educational settings of moto-perceptual skills(Sterelny, 2004(Sterelny, , 2010 and of metacognitive credit(Heersmink and Knight 2018). 11King (2016, p.44) simply mentions the fact that the clinical study of cognitive diversity has led to the marginalisation of atypical individuals.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition

Cassinadri,

Fasoli

2023

Synthese

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Given the explanatory stalemate between ‘embedded’ (EMB) and ‘extended’ (EXT) cognition, various authors have proposed normative and moral arguments in favour of EXT. According to what we call the “extended cognition moral narrative” (EXT-MN) (Cassinadri, 2022), we should embrace EXT and dismiss EMB, because the former leads to morally preferable consequences with respect to the latter. In this article we argue that two arguments following the EXT moral narrative are flawed. In Sect. 2.1 and 2.2, we present respectively King (2016) and Vold’s (2018) ‘argument from assessment of capacities’ (AAC) and Clowes (2013), Farina and Lavazza’s (2022a) ‘cognitive diminishment argument’ (CDA). The AAC states that we should embrace EXT over EMB since the former is better at attributing cognitive credit to individuals with learning disabilities who use assistive tools to complete their learning tasks, thus avoiding their marginalisation. The CDA states that EMB implies a morally undesirable picture of the agent in terms of cognitive diminishment. In Sect. 3, we clarify and criticise the underlying assumptions of the AAC and CDA: the “cognitive credit assumption”, the “marginalisation assumption” and, more generally, an ableist conception of disabled agency. In Sect. 3.1, we discuss the role of moto-perceptual skills and metacognitive credit involved in complex cases of tool-use, to demonstrate that the EXT-MN is uninformative in addressing these cases. To conclude, in Sect. 4 we argue that AAC and CDA fail to present EXT as descriptively and normatively superior to EMB.

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Section: The Cognitive Diminishment Argumentsupporting

confidence: 78%

Section: Final Critiques and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition

Cassinadri,

Fasoli

2023

Synthese

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Why There Are Still Moral Reasons to Prefer Extended over Embedded: a (Short) Reply to Cassinadri

Farina

Lavazza

2022

Philos. Technol.

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ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact

Cassinadri

2024

Philos. Technol.

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According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of extended cognition (EXT) (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). He argues that EXT enables us to consider tools as constitutive parts of the students’ cognitive system, thus preserving their cognitive character from technologically induced cognitive diminishment. The first aim of this paper is to show that this solution is not sufficient to solve the TET. Second, I aim to offer a complementary and more encompassing framework of tool-use to address the TET. Then, I apply it to the educational uses of ChatGPT as the most notable example of LLM, although my arguments can be extended to other generative AI systems. To do so, in Sect. 1.1, I present Pritchard’s framework of cognitive character and virtue epistemology applied in education, to which I am committed in this treatment. In Sects. 2 and 3, I respectively illustrate Pritchard’s (2014) solution to the TET, and I highlight the general limitations of his proposal. Thus, in Sect. 4.1 I characterize ChatGPT as a computational cognitive artifact using Fasoli’s (Fasoli, 2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. In Sect. 4.2, I introduce my proposal, which combines Pritchard’s account of virtue epistemology with Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts to address the TET. Finally, in Sect. 5.1, I present some epistemically virtuous uses of ChatGPT in educational contexts. To conclude, I argue in favor of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing educational activities involving AI technologies such as ChatGPT.

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Moral Reasons Not to Posit Extended Cognitive Systems: a Reply to Farina and Lavazza

Cited by 5 publications

References 35 publications

Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition

Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition

Why There Are Still Moral Reasons to Prefer Extended over Embedded: a (Short) Reply to Cassinadri

ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact

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