Moral perception

Werner, Preston J.

doi:10.1111/phc3.12640

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…CMP is a quite ambitious thesis, and as such, is a matter of controversy on several grounds 15 [19,20]. But one thing which has not been explicitly noted is CMP's commitment to representationalism about perceptual experience.…”

Section: Contentful Moral Perception and Kantian/berkeleyan Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Motivational Internalism is related to Anti-Humeanism. But whereas Anti-Humeanism is a claim about the possibility for moral judgments to intrinsically motivate, Motivational Internalism says that there is a strong-perhaps even necessary-connection between moral judgments and motivation 20 [34]. If we extend Motivational Internalism to any moral representations (not just moral beliefs), we would have an explanation of the motivational nature of moral perception without requiring Berkeleyan Perception.…”

Section: Moral Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?

Werner

2023

Philosophies

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According to contentful moral perception (CMP), moral properties can be perceived in the same sense as tables, tigers, and tomatoes. Recently, Heather Logue (2012) has distinguished between two potential ways of perceiving a property. A Kantian Property (KP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access involves a detection of the property via a representational vehicle. A Berkeleyan Property (BP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access to the property involves that property as partly constitutive of the experience itself. In this paper, I set aside generalized arguments in favor of one view or another, and instead ask whether proponents of CMP have reasons to understand moral perception as Kantian or Berkeleyan. I explore three possible explanatory differences—(a) explaining the intrinsic motivating force of moral perceptions, (b) providing a metasemantics for moral properties, and (c) providing an epistemology of the normative authority of moral properties.

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Section: Contentful Moral Perception and Kantian/berkeleyan Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Moral Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?

Werner

2023

Philosophies

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“…The wrongness of the action is part of the content of your perceptual experience. What we here call moral perception has been referred to as “Canonical Evaluative Perception” (Bergqvist & Cowan 2018 , p. 5) or “Contentful Moral Perception” (Werner 2020 , p. 5). Proponents include Audi 2013 , Cowan 2015 , and Werner 2016 .…”

Section: Ethical Experiences: Phenomenological Distinctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sometimes moral emotions are considered moral perceptions (cf. Werner 2020 , p. 6). Sui generis experience Your evaluative experience that (re-)presents the action of burning the cat as morally wrong or despicable can not be reduced to a perceptual, emotional, or any other kind of experience but is sui generis.…”

Section: Ethical Experiences: Phenomenological Distinctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology

Berghofer

2021

Synthese

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Recently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience’s distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain experiences exhibit a presentive phenomenology and that they are a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of their presentive phenomenology. Such phenomenological approaches usually focus on perceptual experiences and mathematical intuitions. In this paper, I aim at a phenomenological approach to ethical experiences. I shall show that we need to make a distinction between evaluative experiences directed at concrete cases and ethical intuitions directed at general principles. The focus will be on evaluative experiences. I argue that evaluative experiences constitute a sui generis type of experience that gain their justificatory force by virtue of their presentive evaluative phenomenology. In Sect. 1, I introduce and motivate the phenomenological idea that certain experiences exhibit a justification-conferring phenomenology. In Sect. 4, I apply this idea to morally evaluative experiences. In Sect. 5, I suggest that certain epistemic intuitions should be considered epistemically evaluative experiences and I outline a strong parallelism between ethics and epistemology.

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Ethical evidence

Diggin

2022

Synthese

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Moral perception

Cited by 5 publications

References 44 publications

How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?

How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?

Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology

Ethical evidence

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