Moral Luck and the Law

Abstract

Is there a difference in moral blameworthiness between a murderer and an attempted murderer? Should there be a legal difference between them? These questions are particular instances of the question of moral luck and legal luck (respectively). In this paper, I survey and explain the main argumentative moves within the general philosophical discussion of moral luck. I then discuss legal luck, and the different ways in which this discussion may be related to that of moral luck.

Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck

“…That is, an agent breaches a duty of temperance, and, as a result, she dies; she is morally responsible for this result. These passages on imputation highlight that Kant endorses moral responsibility for at least certain kinds of consequences, which is a claim that many Kant scholars recognize (see, for example, Heyd : 37–38; Hill : 159–167; Korsgaard : 259; Moran : 66; Reath 2006: 252–253, 2008: 136–137) and at least a few philosophers working on moral luck recognize (Enoch : 46; Hartman : 113–114).…”

Did Alexander Fleming Deserve the Nobel Prize?

“…As mentioned before, drunken drivers are not prosecuted for manslaughter. Hence, there is legal luck (Enoch 2010). However, these forms of punishment and reward do not stand in a paradoxical tension to CP and CP C , because they concern different meanings of blameworthiness.…”

Debunking, Vindication, and Moral Luck

“…As David Enoch notes, the intuitions on both sides of the debate seem "close to moral bedrock," which leads to a "nagging worry" about whether there is some deeper intuition or premise to rely on in order to decide the debate. See Enoch (2015).…”

“…43. This alternative debunking argument-against the anti-luck position-might take care of Khoury's objection to Enoch andGuttel (Khoury 2018: 1372 n.48) to the effect that they have failed to lift the burden of articulating an alternative argument to the one proposed by critics of moral luck. 44.…”