Moral Luck and Deviant Causation

Bernstein, Sara

doi:10.1111/misp.12110

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 9 publications

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“…In fact, the case combines two different features of the causal relation that have been identified as responsibility-diminishing: First, the causal relation between Jerry's shot and Fred's death is deviant. Deviant causation diminishes responsibility (see Bernstein (2019)). Second, Jerry's shot causally contributes less to Fred's death than Jerry's shot.…”

Section: Garry and Jerrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility

Rolffs

2023

Philos Stud

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Resultant moral luck occurs whenever aspects of an agent’s moral responsibility are affected by luck pertaining to the outcomes of their actions. Many authors reject the existence of moral luck in this sense, but they do so in different ways. Michael Zimmerman argues that resultant luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. That is, it affects what agents are responsible for, but not how responsible they are. Andrew Khoury takes a more resolute approach, arguing that both the scope and the degree of moral responsibility are free from resultant luck.In this paper, I criticize both accounts and develop an alternative. I argue, first, that Khoury’s approach leads to an implausibly far-reaching error-theory about moral responsibility. Second, Zimmerman’s account cannot account for all the ways in which moral responsibility comes in degrees. Third, these problems can be overcome by introducing a distinction between two concepts of responsibility that both come with scope and degree. The first concept I call internal responsibility, as it applies exclusively to agent-internal factors. The second concept I call external responsibility, as it applies to (partly) agent-external factors such as actions and their outcomes. Given this distinction, we can avoid the problems of Khoury’s as well as Zimmerman’s accounts while preserving the central intuition behind the rejection of resultant moral luck.

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Section: Garry and Jerrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility

Rolffs

2023

Philos Stud

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Blameworthiness and Causal Outcomes

Talbert

2024

Erkenn

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It is widely held that whether a person is morally responsible for an outcome partly depends on whether certain causal relations obtain between that person and the outcome. This paper argues that, regardless of whether the preceding claim about moral responsibility is true, moral blameworthiness is independent of such causal considerations. This conclusion is motivated by considering cases from Carolina Sartorio and Sara Bernstein. The causal structures of these cases are complex. Sartorio and Bernstein believe that reaching conclusions about moral responsibility and blameworthiness requires wading through this complexity. But it is argued here that getting clear on these causal structures does not help us assess blameworthiness (regardless of the relevance of such considerations for drawing conclusions about moral responsibility). Moral blameworthiness simply does not turn on the considerations relevant to figuring out whether an agent causally contributed to an outcome.

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It was not supposed to happen like that: blameworthiness, causal deviance and luck

Montminy

2022

Philos Stud

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Moral Luck and Deviant Causation

Cited by 3 publications

References 9 publications

Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility

Resultant moral luck and the scope of moral responsibility

Blameworthiness and Causal Outcomes

It was not supposed to happen like that: blameworthiness, causal deviance and luck

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