Moral Knowledge Without Knowledge of Moral Knowledge

Kaspar, David

doi:10.1007/s10892-021-09384-0

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…An important value of this is that we can offer and compare different varieties of the view. I think that Rossian Intuitionism is best understood as the claim that: (1) we intuitively know (2) several fundamental moral principles, (3) having plural grounds, (4) which are capable of combinations that present apparent moral conflicts, and (5) by considering which our duty might be determined [1] (p. 557).…”

Section: Rossian Intuitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of its main attractions is that it identifies the fundamental moral principles that we really think are true, even after subjecting them to severe testing. Although many might be surprised by this claim, Ross and other intuitionists approach both moral content and moral theory with great epistemic caution (David Kaspar 2022, 158-159) [1]. This applies both to matters normative and metaethical.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such propositions are a source of justification. Furthermore, (3) states that if p meets the condition stated in (1) and S meets the conditions stated in (2) in relation to p, then p is evident to S. This is how the evidence in p makes p evident to one. And under such conditions, one has a very high degree of justification in believing p.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

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Rossian Intuitionism without Self-Evidence?

Kaspar

2022

Philosophies

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The first phase of the recent intuitionist revival left untouched Ross’s claim that fundamental moral truths are self-evident. In a recent article, Robert Cowan attempts to explain, in a plausible way, how we know moral truths. The result is that, while the broad framework of Ross’s theory appears to remain in place, the self-evidence of moral truths is thrown into doubt. In this paper, I examine Cowan’s Conceptual Intuitionism. I use his own proposal to show how he arrives at a skeptical position on self-evidence. First, he completely ignores the kind of epistemic appraisal intuitionism has always rested on; second, he is committed to the Reasons View of prima facie duty, rather than to Ross’s Properties View; third, he holds that a commitment to self-evidence often comes with a commitment to metaphysically extravagant entities, which he calls Perceptualism; fourth, he scrutinizes only a part of the contemporary theory of self-evidence, overlooking the strengths of the theory when considered as a whole. Revealing these several points supports the conclusion that Cowan has not provided a viable variety of Rossian Intuitionism.

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Section: Rossian Intuitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%