Moral Hazards in Cyber Vulnerability Markets

Abstract

B ug-bounty programs may be distinguished by the nature of their management. Internal programs are run by software companies themselves, while third-party programs are managed by intermediaries or brokers that operate either as for-profit businesses or clandestine services. These third-party programs fuel the gray and black markets for software vulnerabilities that benefit software developers or cyber mercenaries, respectively, especially state actors who seek to acquire robust cyber warfare tool s. T he l a rges t con s u mer of black-market software vulnerabilities is most likely the U.S. National Security Agency's (NSA's) Vulnerability Equities Process (VEP). The motives behind these two markets are very different; the former is primarily economic, whereas the latter is cyberpolitical.

Optimizing Bug Bounty Programs for Efficient Malware-Related Vulnerability Discovery

“…Bug bounty programs typically follow a crowdsourcing model in which there is an open call for people to anonymously test software [3]. However, bug bounty programs can be further improved by focusing on strategies that enhance their effectiveness [1].…”

“…In parallel, bug bounty programs have become a crucial component of cybersecurity, leveraging the collective global expertise of security researchers to identify and mitigate threats and provide incentives for their discoveries [2]. These programs also raise substantial ethical questions related to the monetization of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, necessitating an analysis of the associated moral implications [3]. Additionally, this study explored the characteristics of security bugs, which are critical for establishing a robust vulnerability management framework [4].…”