2019
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8489.12290
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Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines

Abstract: This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production (COP) crop insurance products. Building on existing crop insurance models of moral hazard, as well as a survey‐based data set that allows us to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection, we find evidence that farmers insured under COP contracts spend more on chemical fertilizers and pesticides (i.e. those inputs whose costs determine the indemnity payments). However, since these same COP insured farmers are… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Household size is expected to influence farmers' adaptation decisions positively because as a proxy for farm labour, it reduces the constraints on adopting labour-intensive adaptation practices (Mignouna et al 2011a;Mignouna et al 2011b;Ndamani and Watanabe 2016). Regarding gender, studies show that male farmers adapt more readily to climate change than their female counterparts because men have more agricultural resource endowments (Deressa et al, 2008;Doss and Morris 2001;He et al 2019) and women's access to agricultural resources and information is often slim due to traditional barriers (Ndiritu et al 2014). Scholars have reported both positive and negative impacts of marital status on adoption in Nigeria (Adesope et al 2012;Elemasho et al 2017).…”
Section: Endogenous Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Household size is expected to influence farmers' adaptation decisions positively because as a proxy for farm labour, it reduces the constraints on adopting labour-intensive adaptation practices (Mignouna et al 2011a;Mignouna et al 2011b;Ndamani and Watanabe 2016). Regarding gender, studies show that male farmers adapt more readily to climate change than their female counterparts because men have more agricultural resource endowments (Deressa et al, 2008;Doss and Morris 2001;He et al 2019) and women's access to agricultural resources and information is often slim due to traditional barriers (Ndiritu et al 2014). Scholars have reported both positive and negative impacts of marital status on adoption in Nigeria (Adesope et al 2012;Elemasho et al 2017).…”
Section: Endogenous Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The presence of asymmetric information between the counterparties give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection. These problems have affected the continued sustainability and health of these insurance products (He et al, 2019). This in turn impede the development of agricultural insurance market.…”
Section: Challenges Arise From Traditional Indemnitybased Agriculturamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Adverse selection happens when technical expertise deficiencies make the insurance providers find it hard and costly to distinguish between lowrisk and high-risk policyholders and hence fail to determine premiums corresponding with each type of risk exposure (Romero and Molina, 2015). As a result, it will negatively affect the profitability of insurers as the payment of indemnities is much greater than premiums collected (He et al, 2019). Romero and Molina further asserted that the consequences of adverse selection will hamper the emergence of insurance market (Romero and Molina, 2015).…”
Section: Adverse Selectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, China's COP insurance program only compensates farmers a portion of the costs spent on inputs if yields fall below insured levels (Zhong & Zhu, 2017). Likewise, in the Philippines, farmers are required to submit an input use plan upon COP insurance application, and the indemnity payment is a percentage of the total input costs stated in the plan (He, Rejesus, Zheng, & Yorobe, 2018; He, Zheng, Rejesus, & Yorobe, 2019; Reyes, Mina, Gloria, & Mercado, 2015). The COP insurance products are structured differently as compared to the yield‐ and revenue‐based products in the United States and may hence affect input use differently.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%