Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy

Clarke‐Doane, Justin

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00875.x

Cited by 43 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…And it brings our discussion into line with the standard debate in the philosophy of mathematics that has been generalized to metaethics (e.g. Field ; Enoch ; Clarke‐Doane , ). Most importantly, reliability provides a good benchmark for progress in bridging the chasm highlighted by Benacerraf.…”

Section: The Generalized Integration Challengementioning

confidence: 61%

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

Schroeter

2017

Nous

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The Generalized Integration Challenge (GIC) is the task of providing, for a given domain of discourse, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics, epistemology and metasemantics and showing them to be so. In this paper, we focus on a metaethical position for which (GIC) seems particularly acute: the brand of normative realism which takes normative properties to be (i) mind‐independent and (ii) causally inert. The problem is that these metaphysical commitments seem to make normative knowledge impossible. We suggest that bringing metasemantics into play can help to resolve this puzzle. We propose an independently plausible metasemantic constraint on reference determination and show how it can provide a plausible response to (GIC) for this brand of normative realism.

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Section: The Generalized Integration Challengementioning

confidence: 61%

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

Schroeter

2017

Nous

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“…We begin with particular propositions that we deem plausible and seek general principles which systematize those propositions. Such principles, in turn, often pressure us to reject the propositions with which we began as we seek optimum harmony between the two” (Clarke‐Doane , 240). This picture of mathematical justification is very different from what the early modern rationalists had in mind and would not have served their antiskeptical and antivoluntarist purposes.…”

Section: Contemporary Mathematics‐morality Analogymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When discussing the a priori nature of moral thinking, he says that “we seem to arrive at some conclusions of the form, ‘if x is F, then x is M,’ where ‘F’ is an intuitively descriptive predicate, and ‘M’ is an intuitively moral predicate, independent of such evidence. This is how we are often said to arrive at ‘pure’ mathematical conclusions—such as that 2 is prime or that any set of real numbers with an upper bound has a least upper bound” (Clarke‐Doane , 239). On its own, this is a very impoverished example of moral argument.…”

Section: Contemporary Mathematics‐morality Analogymentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality is Not Like Mathematics: The Weakness of the Math‐Moral Analogy

Gill¹

2019

The Southern J of Philosophy

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In both the early modern period and in contemporary debates, philosophers have argued that there are analogies between mathematics and morality that imply that the ontology and epistemology of morality are crucially similar to the ontology and epistemology of mathematics. I describe arguments for the math‐moral analogy in four early modern philosophers (Locke, Cudworth, Clarke, and Balguy) and in three contemporary philosophers (Clarke‐Doane, Peacocke, and Roberts). I argue that these arguments fail to establish important ontological and epistemological similarities between morality and mathematics. There are analogies between the two areas, but the disanalogies are more significant, undermining the attempt to confer on morality the same ontological and epistemological status that mathematics possesses.

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“…5 He argues that the challenge to 'explain the reliability of our D-beliefs' is best understood as a challenge to show that our beliefs in the truths of a domain D are modally secure, i.e. sensitive and safe.…”

Section: Evolution Against Realism: Debunking Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Access Problems and explanatory overkill

Jonas

2016

Philos Stud

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I argue that recent attempts to deflect Access Problems for realism about a priori domains such as mathematics, logic, morality, and modality using arguments from evolution result in two kinds of explanatory overkill: (1) the Access Problem is eliminated for contentious domains, and (2) realist belief becomes viciously immune to arguments from dispensability, and to non-rebutting counter-arguments more generally. Access ProblemsLet D be a domain of a priori truths. The Access Problem (also known as the Reliability Challenge) for realism about D consists in the apparent impossibility of explaining how knowledge of the D-truths is possible, if these truths are understood realistically (i.e. as objectively/ response-independently/ robustly true). Formulated as a question: How could it be anything but a fluke that our D-beliefs reliably match the D-truths? Failure to provide an explanation suitable to bridge this gap between the D-truths and the subject holding Dbeliefs has been argued to undermine realist belief in the D-truths.2 Domains supposedly affected by Access Problems are:Mathematics: The Access Problem for the domain of mathematics is also known as the Benacerraf-Field Challenge. Benacerraf points out that "If...numbers are the kinds of entities they are normally taken to be [namely, mind-independent abstract objects], then the connection between the truth conditions for the statements of number theory and any relevant events connected with the people who are supposed to have mathematical knowledge cannot be made out" (1973: 673). Field clarifies: "Benacerraf's challenge...is to provide an account of the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about these remote entities can so well reflect the facts about them...The idea is that if it appears in principle impossible to explain this, 1 Many thanks to Ana Bajzelj, Claire Benn, Sharon Berry, Meir Buzaglo, Elvira DiBona, Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch, Peter Gerdes, Sharon Krishek, Arnon Levy, Ittay NissanRozen, Olla Solomyak, Ruth Weintraub, and an anonymous referee, for helpful comments and discussions.2 The Access Problem is a problem for realism specifically. As such, it is not identical to the more general epistemic problem of justification: a theory of justification (for example coherentism) can explain how our beliefs are justified, yet fail to eliminate the Access Problem.

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Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy

Cited by 43 publications

References 33 publications

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

Morality is Not Like Mathematics: The Weakness of the Math‐Moral Analogy

Access Problems and explanatory overkill

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