Moral control and ownership in AI systems

Fabre, Raúl González; Ibáñez, Javier Camacho; Escobar, Pedro Tejedor

doi:10.1007/s00146-020-01020-z

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 45 publications

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“…But there is nothing inevitable in humans taking this determination. AI systems can be designed such that humans have total or partial moral control, or even to relinquish control entirely, but the initial decision on which architecture to employ belongs to humans alone (González-Fabre et al 2020). We could promulgate laws that prohibit or severely restrict their use; we could even make always putting humans in the loop obligatory.…”

Section: Reasons Based On "Inevitability"mentioning

confidence: 99%

A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

Sisón

Redín

2021

AI & Soc

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We examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) and its rebuttal by Formosa and Ryan (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian ethical background. Neither Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) essay nor Formosa and Ryan’s (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) is explicitly framed within the teachings of a specific ethical school. The former appeals to the lack of “both empirical and intuitive support” (Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019, p. 721) for AMAs, and the latter opts for “argumentative breadth over depth”, meaning to provide “the essential groundwork for making an all things considered judgment regarding the moral case for building AMAs” (Formosa and Ryan 2019, pp. 1–2). Although this strategy may benefit their acceptability, it may also detract from their ethical rootedness, coherence, and persuasiveness, characteristics often associated with consolidated ethical traditions. Neo-Aristotelian ethics, backed by a distinctive philosophical anthropology and worldview, is summoned to fill this gap as a standard to test these two opposing claims. It provides a substantive account of moral agency through the theory of voluntary action; it explains how voluntary action is tied to intelligent and autonomous human life; and it distinguishes machine operations from voluntary actions through the categories of poiesis and praxis respectively. This standpoint reveals that while Van Wynsberghe and Robbins may be right in rejecting the need for AMAs, there are deeper, more fundamental reasons. In addition, despite disagreeing with Formosa and Ryan’s defense of AMAs, their call for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach, similar to neo-Aristotelian practical wisdom, becomes expedient.

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Section: Reasons Based On "Inevitability"mentioning

confidence: 99%