1992
DOI: 10.1007/bf01258281
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Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games

Abstract: Given a coalition of an n-person cooperative game in characteristic function form, we can associate a zero-one vector whose non-zero coordinates identify the players in the given coalition. The cooperative game with this identification is just a map on such vectors. By allowing each coordinate to take finitely many values we can define multi-choice cooperative games. In such multi-choice games we can also define Shapley value axiomatically. We show that this multi-choice Shapley value is dummy free of actions,… Show more

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Cited by 50 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…As we know solutions of multi-choice TU games can be applied to many fields, such as economics, political sciences, accounting, and even military sciences. Related results may be found in Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), van den Nouweland et al (1995), Klijn et al (1999), Peters and Zank (2005), Grabisch and Lange (2007), Hwang and Liao (2008) and so on.…”
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confidence: 74%
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“…As we know solutions of multi-choice TU games can be applied to many fields, such as economics, political sciences, accounting, and even military sciences. Related results may be found in Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), van den Nouweland et al (1995), Klijn et al (1999), Peters and Zank (2005), Grabisch and Lange (2007), Hwang and Liao (2008) and so on.…”
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confidence: 74%
“…Hsiao and Raghavan 1992), each player has several activity levels. Hence, multi-choice TU games constitute a generalization of standard coalition TU games.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Obviously, (4) degenerates to be the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value [1] where the range of the mapping v is N , namely, every player has two activity levels 0 and 1. Furthermore, (4) degenerates to be the value for multichoice games introduced by van den Nouweland, et al [5] where h is equal to 1.…”
Section: A Value For Multichoice Games With a Coalition Structurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, a clan game whose all subgames are also clan games is called a total clan game. A more sophisticated model of cooperative games, which is a natural extension of the traditional model, called multi-choice game, was introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992Raghavan ( , 1993 and reconsidered by Nouweland et al (1995) in a more general setting. Multi-choice cooperative games have become a useful tool for modeling interaction of players in situations in which they may have different options for cooperation, varying from non-cooperation (participation level 0) to a maximal participation level which is greater than or equal to 1.…”
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confidence: 98%