Monitoring: Which institutions matter?

The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Innovation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

“…For example, Bushee (1998) finds that short-term institutional investors result in managerial short-termism while long-term institutional investors reduce this tendency. Chen et al (2007) find that "independent" institutional investors tend to collect information and do active monitoring while "grey" institutional investors tend to hold shares quietly. They define mutual funds and investment advisers as "independent", and bank trusts, pension funds, insurance companies, and other institutions as "grey."…”

Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

“…Union pension funds are also extremely active through the media (Schwab and Thomas 1998) and have been successful in influencing regulatory reform (Davis and Kim 2007;Bainbridge 2006). 3 In particular, mutual funds and private pension funds have been found to be effective monitors of management (Brickley et al 1988;Borokhovich et al 2006;Agrawal and Mandelkar 1990;Chen, Harford, and Li 2007;Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998).…”

The Influence of Corporate Governance in Chinese Companies on Discretionary Accruals and Real Earnings Management

“…They demonstrate that institutional owners with high shareholdings can monitor and inhibit managers from conducting earnings management by self-interested behavior. Chen et al (2007) and Koh (2007) also indicate that institutions with higher holdings and longer investments could gain more benefits from monitoring. Hsu and Wang (2014) explore the influence of the proportion and stability of institutional shareholdings on discretionary accruals and real earnings management, finding that institutions with high and unstable shareholdings would push managers to conduct discretionary accruals for short-term profitability.…”