Money, politics, and the regulation of public accounting services: Evidence from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002

Thornburg, Steven; Roberts, Robin W.

doi:10.1016/j.aos.2007.03.004

Cited by 56 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In its journal it prides itself of having influence on policy outcomes by understanding the policymaking process and by being able to deliver timely information (Lee and Rudd 1988;Lee 1988). Unsurprisingly, an empirical study of political action committee contributions found that members of the accounting profession gave significantly greater contributions to legislators who were members of committees having jurisdiction over accounting affairs (Thornburg and Roberts 2008). The study's findings are consistent with the access hypothesis which predicts that special interest groups donate in order to get in a position where they can provide information to a relevant policy-maker.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 60%

Accounting and Regulation

Pietra¹,

McLeay²,

Ronen³

2014

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 60%

Accounting and Regulation

Pietra¹,

McLeay²,

Ronen³

2014

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“…was supported by the Accountants Coalition and the American Tort Reform Association (Roberts et al 2003). Also, the AICPA and Big 4 firms aggressively supported the Oxley version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which they viewed as more favorable (Thornburg and Roberts 2008).…”

Section: Conceptual Development and Research Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, while the political campaign contributions of the profession have been studied (Roberts et al 2003;Dwyer and Roberts 2004;Roberts 2006;Thornburg and Roberts 2008), less has been written about its lobbying activities. Thus, we know very little about the profession's motivations for lobbying or its lobbying efforts in general.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Examination of the U.S. Public Accounting Profession’s Public Interest Discourse and Actions in Federal Policy Making

Baudot

Wallace

2016

J Bus Ethics

Self Cite

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Participation in the political process by the United States public accounting profession often blurs the role of the profession as advocates for the public interest with its role as advocates for its own private interests. In this study, we draw from prior theoretical and empirical work to investigate recent federal political activities of the public accounting profession to shed light on these sometimes contradictory roles. In particular, we investigate ten contemporary regulatory issues of interest to the AICPA. We analyze 36 AICPA legislative advocacy letters related to these issues that were provided to federal policy makers. In addition, we analyze the public accounting profession's federal lobbying reports that were submitted during this same time period. The analysis allows us to assess the public interest discourse present in the AICPA legislative letters as well as the extent of political action taken by the profession related to these issues based on the profession's lobbying efforts. Our analyses (1) demonstrate that the profession's discourse and actions often reflect both public and private interest motivations, (2) allow us to categorize the profession's advocacy efforts as arising from specific motivations, and (3) show that the profession's public interest arguments used to advocate for their policy positions change depending upon the specific legislative issue being considered.

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“…There is extensive work on other reasons for "bad" or imperfect accounting rules, such as political pressure group activities (Watts and Zimmerman 1979), including agency problems on the part of politicians and regulators and political activity by accounting firms (e.g., Thornburg and Roberts 2008). However, the CAR Vol.…”

Section: Bad Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is extensive work on other reasons for 'bad' or imperfect accounting rules, such as political pressure group activities (Watts and Zimmerman 1979), including agency problems on the part of politicians and regulators, and political activity by accounting firms (e.g., Thornburg and Roberts 2008). However, the ability of officials to choose bad policies, and for special interest groups to influence policy in detrimental ways, is probably a consequence of the limited attention and psychological biases of voters.…”

Section: Bad Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy*

Hirshleifer

Teoh

2009

Contemporary Accting Res

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We offer here the psychological attraction approach to accounting and disclosure rules, regulation, and policy as a program for positive accounting research. We suggest that psychological forces have shaped and continue to shape rules and policies in two different ways. (1) Good Rules for Bad Users: rules and policies that provide information in a form that is useful for users who are subject to bias and cognitive processing constraints. (2) Bad Rules: superfluous or even pernicious rules and policies that result from psychological bias on the part of the 'designers' (managers, users, auditors, regulators, politicians, or voters). We offer some initial ideas about psychological sources of the use of historical costs, conservatism, aggregation, and a focus on downside outcomes in risk disclosures. We also suggest that psychological forces cause informal shifts in reporting and disclosure regulation and policy, which can exacerbate boom/bust patterns in financial markets.

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Money, politics, and the regulation of public accounting services: Evidence from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002

Cited by 56 publications

References 23 publications

Accounting and Regulation

Accounting and Regulation

An Examination of the U.S. Public Accounting Profession’s Public Interest Discourse and Actions in Federal Policy Making

The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy*

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