People think that some things that they value should be protected from trade-offs with other things. For example, people think that no economic gain is great enough to justify clear-cutting old-growth forest. The authors probed the stability of these protected values (PVs) in several ways. Subjects were asked to think of counterexamples, and this had some effect on PVs. Subjects were then asked how they would resolve conflicts between 2 PVs. Resolutions did not differ from those between other values, but subjects tended to feel that conflicts between PVs did not occur in reality. Despite people's claims that PVs are unchanged by variation in quantity, expression of PVs was reduced when the magnitude or probability of the violation of a PV was smaller. In summary, PVs appear to be labile and amenable to challenge. Despite earlier concerns, apparent PVs may not always preclude the use of valuation measures in cost-effectiveness analysis or negotiated agreement on controversial issues. People think that some of their values are protected from tradeoffs with other values (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, Lemer, & Peterson, 1996). Many of these values concern natural resources, such as species and pristine ecosystems. People with protected values (PVs) for these things do not think they should be sacrificed for any compensating benefit, no matter how small the sacrifice or how large the benefit. The term value here is used to mean utility, that is, the measure of desirability that decisions are meant to increase (Baron, 2000). In an economic sense, when values are protected, the marginal rate at which one good can substitute for another is infinite. For example, no amount of money can substitute for a type of environmental decline. Several researchers have noted that PVs cause problems for quantitative elicitation of values, as is done in cost-benefit analysis or decision analysis (