Money for nothin’ and coal for free: ‘Technology neutrality’ and biomass development under the Flemish tradable green certificate scheme

Carton, Wim

doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.02.010

Cited by 12 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…This literature includes work on TPS (e.g. Carton, 2016; Cooper, 2015; Mansfield, 2004, 2006), but has also focused on forms of market governance like wetland banking (Robertson, 2004, 2006), stream mitigation banking (Lave, 2012), or payments/compensation for environmental services (PES/CES) (McAfee, 1999; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Osborne, 2013). This literature has coincided with the rise of the ‘financialization thesis’, or the notion that finance plays an increasingly important role in the global economy (French et al., 2011; Krippner, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2009; Moore, 2011a).…”

Section: Performing Market Governance In Capitalist World Ecologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hybridity, possibility: Degrees of marketization in tradeable permit systems

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2017

Environ Plan A

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https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epa Environment and Planning A Hybridity, possibility: Degrees of marketization in tradeable permit systemsTradeable permit systems for allocating rights to impact the environment have become an important part of the regulatory toolkit over the last 35 years. Informed by elegant neoclassical economic thought, these regulatory markets promise lowest-cost environmental benefit by delegating decision-making to market participants. This article examines tradeable permits systems, including cap-and-trade carbon markets, tradeable water quality permits, and individual transferable quotas for fisheries, to understand the actual outcomes of attempts to transfer environmental governance to markets. Drawing on heterodox economic thought and the neoliberal natures literature, this article examines the institutional forms tradeable permit systems engender in conjunction with a neoclassical definition of 'market' to provide an internal critique of environmental marketization. In general, tradeable permit systems do not facilitate highly liquid financial markets that might signal the increasing importance of regulatory markets as an accumulation strategy for capital. Instead, market-based regulation tends to behave rather differently, acting as performance standards, quotas, or environmental taxes. The article concludes by reflecting on the political possibilities afforded by the recognition that regulatory markets, for the most part, bear little resemblance to high-flying financial markets.

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Section: Performing Market Governance In Capitalist World Ecologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hybridity, possibility: Degrees of marketization in tradeable permit systems

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2017

Environ Plan A

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“…The EU ETS is a Europe‐wide system covering multiple sectors, while the Flemish TGC is a relatively small regional scheme only focused on electricity production. An exhaustive description of the peculiarities of each scheme, and indeed of the problematic track records that has characterized both, is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Bailey ; Carton ; El Kasmioui et al ; Ellerman et al ; Morris ). What matters here is that, beyond clear differences in design, proximate objectives and implementation, significant commonalities exist in the broader context, central logic and ideological assumptions underpinning both schemes.…”

Section: A Market‐based Approach: the Eu Ets And The Flemish Tgc Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Over 10 years of experience with this scheme allows some conclusions to be drawn about the kind of strategies it has incentivized. By far the most successful technologies have been those based on biomass and biogas derived from waste‐flows, agriculture or forestry, accounting for well over half of all certificates issued between 2002 and 2013 (Carton ; El Kasmioui et al ). Of these, the vast majority went to Flanders’ (then) four coal power plants to support the co‐firing of biomass (mixed in with coal) or, after 2009, the combustion of 100% biomass in fully converted coal power plants.…”

Section: The Inertia Of Economic Efficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Dancing to the Rhythms of the Fossil Fuel Landscape: Landscape Inertia and the Temporal Limits to Market-Based Climate Policy

Carton

2016

Antipode

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This article makes a contribution to the critique of market-based mechanisms for climate and energy policy. It explores the environmental effectiveness of market instruments by engaging a broadly conceived "fossil fuel landscape", or the material, social, and political inertia of fossil energy dependence, as a factor delimiting policy outcomes. The argument is developed through a focus on the idea of economic efficiency as a key ideological construct underlying market-based policy, and draws on examples from two different market instruments, namely the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and the Flemish tradable green certificate scheme. I argue that an understanding of the shortcomings of these, and similar, policies requires acknowledgment of the political and socioeconomic power that emanates from the temporal dynamics of fossil fuel capitalism, which are reproduced when economic efficiency becomes the key focus of climate policy.

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“…For this reason, calls have been put forward to make hard protective technology policy 'technology-neutral', for instance, in the area of ICT, climate change technology, and biotechnology. At the same time, this has given rise to concerns regarding both the desirability and feasibility of introducing technology-neutral policies (Azar & Sandén, 2011;Carton, 2016;Greenberg, 2016;Hildebrandt & Tielemans, 2013;Munthe, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Neutrality in European Regulation of GMOs

Sandin

Munthe

Björnberg

2021

Ethics, Policy & Environment

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Objections to the current EU regulatory system on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in terms of high cost and lack of consistency, speed and scientific underpinning have prompted proposals for a more technology-neutral system. We sketch the conceptual background of the notion of 'technology neutrality' and propose a refined definition of the term. The proposed definition implies that technology neutrality of a regulatory system is a gradual and multidimensional feature. We use the definition to analyze two regulatory reform proposals: One proposal from the Netherlands for improving the exemption mechanism for GMOs under Directive 2001/18/EC, and one from the Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board, outlining a new stratified risk assessment procedure. While both proposals offer some degree of improved technology neutrality in some dimensions compared to current EU regulation, in some extents and dimensions, they do not. We conclude that proposals for more technology-neutral regulation of GMOs need, first, to make explicit to what extent and in what dimensions the proposal improves neutrality and, second, to present arguments supporting that these specific improvements constitute desirable policy change against the background of objections to current policy.

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Money for nothin’ and coal for free: ‘Technology neutrality’ and biomass development under the Flemish tradable green certificate scheme

Cited by 12 publications

References 41 publications

Hybridity, possibility: Degrees of marketization in tradeable permit systems

Hybridity, possibility: Degrees of marketization in tradeable permit systems

Dancing to the Rhythms of the Fossil Fuel Landscape: Landscape Inertia and the Temporal Limits to Market-Based Climate Policy

Technology Neutrality in European Regulation of GMOs

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