Modulating the experience of agency: a positron emission tomography study

Farrer, Chlöé; Franck, Nicolás; Guillaume, Nicolas; Frith, C. D.; Decety, Jean; Jeannerod, Marc

doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(02)00041-1

Cited by 618 publications

(484 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…This incorrect gait agency during goal-directed locomotion and navigation suggests that the conscious monitoring of an agent's moving body is not reliable and that the generation of full-body locomotion and the building of a conscious experience of it are distinct brain processes. The value of 10-15°above which angular biases during cyclic locomotion were more often correctly perceived than not by our participants (no selfattribution) was compatible with earlier work on agency for goaldirected hand and arm movements (thresholds of 6.5°-15°; Farrer et al, 2003;Franck et al, 2001;Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004;Posada et al, 2007;Slachevsky et al, 2001;Synofzik et al, 2006).…”

Section: Spatial Visuo-motor Conflicts and Full-body Agencysupporting

confidence: 91%

“…Most previous work on agency has focussed on the investigation of performance-related visual cues (Daprati et al, 1997;Farrer et al, 2003;Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998;Franck et al, 2001;Salomon et al, 2011;Shimada et al, 2010;Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005;van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002). Yet, the majority of our actions have consequences that are apparent across multiple sensory modalities including touch and audition.…”

Section: Temporal Auditory Motor Conflicts and Full-body Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also mention that upper-limb agency has been addressed in a number of functional brain imaging studies revealing a distributed network of involved brain areas (reviewed by David et al, 2008) that includes supplementary motor area (Farrer and Frith, 2002;Moore et al, 2010a), the cerebellum (Blakemore et al, 2001) but also associative cortices, i.e. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fink et al, 1999), posterior parietal cortex (Farrer et al, 2003;Farrer and Frith, 2002), posterior superior temporal sulcus (Leube et al, 2003) and the insula (Cunnington et al, 2006).…”

Section: The Neuroscience Of Gait and Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agency, gait and self-consciousness

Kannape

Blanke

2012

International Journal of Psychophysiology

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Agency is an important aspect of bodily self-consciousness, allowing us to separate own movements from those induced by the environment and to distinguish own movements from those of other agents. Unsurprisingly, theoretical frameworks for agency such as central monitoring are closely tied to computational models of sensorimotor control. Until recently agency research has largely focussed on goal-directed movements of the upper limbs. In particular, the influence of performance-related sensory cues and the relevance of prediction signals for agency judgements have been studied through a variety of spatio-temporal mismatches between movement and the sensory consequences of movement. However, agents often perform a different type of movement; highly automated movements that involve the entire body such as walking, cycling, and swimming with potentially different agency mechanisms. Here, we review recent work about agency for full-body movements such as gait, highlighting the effects of performance-related visual and auditory cues on gait agency. Gait movements differ from upper limb actions. Gait is cyclic, more rarely immediately goal-directed, and is generally considered one of the most automatic and unconscious actions. We discuss such movement differences with respect to the functional mechanisms of full-body agency and body-part agency by linking these gait agency paradigms to computational models of motor control. This is followed by a selective review of gait control, locomotion, and models of motor control relying on prediction signals and underlining their relevance for full-body agency.

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Section: Spatial Visuo-motor Conflicts and Full-body Agencysupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Temporal Auditory Motor Conflicts and Full-body Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Neuroscience Of Gait and Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agency, gait and self-consciousness

Kannape

Blanke

2012

International Journal of Psychophysiology

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“…Although these tasks are only somewhat similar and could have been separated in two task distinct categories (if more studies were available), they both require the perceiver to distinguish own action perspective and goal from those of other persons. Nevertheless, these tasks consistently engage the TPJ (75% and 50%), in agreement with several similar PET studies that also reveal the TPJ as major site of brain activation Decety et al, 2002;Farrer et al, 2003;Ruby and Decety, 2001]. Action Goals: Participants are requested to identify the likely or desired end state of a story in comparison with mere physical consequences (e.g., a gulf destroying a sand castle at the beach).…”

Section: Identifying Action Intentionsupporting

confidence: 73%

Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis

Overwalle

2008

Human Brain Mapping

1,492

102

1,300

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This meta-analysis explores the location and function of brain areas involved in social cognition, or the capacity to understand people's behavioral intentions, social beliefs, and personality traits. On the basis of over 200 fMRI studies, it tests alternative theoretical proposals that attempt to explain how several brain areas process information relevant for social cognition. The results suggest that inferring temporary states such as goals, intentions, and desires of other people-even when they are false and unjust from our own perspective-strongly engages the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Inferring more enduring dispositions of others and the self, or interpersonal norms and scripts, engages the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), although temporal states can also activate the mPFC. Other candidate tasks reflecting general-purpose brain processes that may potentially subserve social cognition are briefly reviewed, such as sequence learning, causality detection, emotion processing, and executive functioning (action monitoring, attention, dual task monitoring, episodic memory retrieval), but none of them overlaps uniquely with the regions activated during social cognition. Hence, it appears that social cognition particularly engages the TPJ and mPFC regions. The available evidence is consistent with the role of a TPJ-related mirror system for inferring temporary goals and intentions at a relatively perceptual level of representation, and the mPFC as a module that integrates social information across time and allows reflection and representation of traits and norms, and presumably also of intentionality, at a more abstract cognitive level.

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“…However, BOLD signal in the anterior insula was significantly different in the comparison of non-isomorphic and isomorphic joint action. A number of experiments suggest that the insula (in addition to the TPJ) plays a role in the attribution of agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002;Farrer et al, 2003). The current finding suggests that the brain bases of attribution of agency in joint-action situations may critically depend on the exact nature of the task.…”

Section: Different Joint Action Different Functional Signaturementioning

confidence: 48%

Anatomical substrates of cooperative joint-action in a continuous motor task: Virtual lifting and balancing

et al. 2008

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An emerging branch of social cognitive neuroscience attempts to unravel the critical cognitive mechanisms that enable humans to engage in joint action. In the current experiment, differences in brain activity in participants engaging in solitary action and joint action were identified using whole brain fMRI while participants performed a virtual barbalancing task either alone (S), or with the help of a partner in each of two separate joint-action conditions (isomorphic [J i ] and non-isomorphic [J n ]). Compared to the performing the task alone, BOLD signal was found to be stronger in both joint-action conditions at specific sites in the human mirror system (MNS). This activation pattern may reflect the demand on participants to simulate the actions of others, integrate their own actions with those of their partners, and compute appropriate responses. Increasing inter-dependence (complementarity) of movements being generated by cooperating individuals (J n N J i N S) was found to correlate with BOLD signal in the right anterior node of the MNS (pars opercularis), and the area around the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ). These data are relevant to current debates concerning the role of right IFG in complementary action, as well as evolving theories of joint action.

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Modulating the experience of agency: a positron emission tomography study

Cited by 618 publications

References 32 publications

Agency, gait and self-consciousness

Agency, gait and self-consciousness

Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis

Anatomical substrates of cooperative joint-action in a continuous motor task: Virtual lifting and balancing

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