Modular processes in mind and brain

Abstract

One approach to understanding a complex process starts with an attempt to divide it into modules: subprocesses that are independent in some sense, and have distinct functions. In this paper, I discuss an approach to the modular decomposition of neural and mental processes. Several examples of process decomposition are presented, together with discussion of inferential requirements. Two examples are of well-established and purely behavioural realizations of the approach (signal detection theory applied to discrimination data; the method of additive factors applied to reaction-time data), and lead to the identification of mental modules. Other examples, leading to the identification of modular neural processes, use brain measures, including the fMRI signal, the latencies of electrophysiological events, and their amplitudes. Some measures are pure (reflecting just one process), while others are composite. Two of the examples reveal mental and neural modules that correspond. Attempts to associate brain regions with behaviourally defined processing modules that use a brain manipulation (transcranial magnetic stimulation, TMS) are promising but incomplete. I show why the process-decomposition approach discussed here, in which the criterion for modularity is separate modifiability, is superior for modular decomposition to the more frequently used task comparison procedure (often used in cognitive neuropsychology) and to its associated subtraction method. To demonstrate the limitations of task comparison, I describe the erroneous conclusion to which it has led about sleep deprivation, and the interpretive difficulties in a TMS study.

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