Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Abstract

2 of counterinsurgency, in Nagaland and Kashmir, he asserts that ideological penetration of the "politics of conflict resolution" has profoundly affected counterinsurgency operations in both theaters. Where ideological penetration is high, the state has evinced a willingness to accept the logic of ballots; where it is weak, the logic of ballots has been made subservient to the logic of bullets. AbstractFor the first time since 1984, the 2014 general elections handed a majority in the Lok Sabha to a single party. This article provides a critical assessment of what the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party has meant for the dynamics of center-state relations in India. In doing so, the article first engages with the concept of "competitive-cooperative federalism" and more widely with a framework that allows us to locate shifts in center-state relations across three dimensions: the political, the fiscal, and the administrative. Overall, we argue that despite the BJP's promise to put "center-state relations on an even keel" these relations have become more centralized under the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi. At the same time, this process of centralization has not been uniform across the three identified dimensions: centralization is strongest in the political domain, but weakest in fiscal matters, where the central government felt bound by the recommendations of the XIV Finance Commission and by longstanding intergovernmental discussions on overhauling India's complex indirect taxation system with a polity-wide Goods and Services Tax, the management of which relies on center-state consent.

State Capacity, Ideology and the Management of COVID-19 in South Asia: India and Sri Lanka in Perspective

“…The latter are enlisted as exclusive state legislative powers in the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution, while labour is listed as a concurrent entry, implying that both the centre and the states can legislate on labour. Federalism in India constrains the capacity of the nationally ruling BJP to centre the polity along the lines of ‘One Nation Federalism’ (Aiyar & Tillin, 2020; Sharma & Swenden, 2018), with an integrated and harmonized market in which fiscal and legislative powers are concentrated at the central level and in which the states and districts largely implement centrally designed policies with limited discretion for subnational variation. While the BJP asserted its authority by declaring the pandemic a ‘national disaster’ during the first national lockdown, the states regained control in the process of gradual unlocking, and, with it, cross-state variations in the response to COVID-19 resurfaced.…”

The dynamics of federal (in)stability and negotiated cooperation under single-party dominance: insights from Modi’s India

“…Modi's government is facing a scenario similar to the Indira era in Indian politics. There is stiff political competition at the state level, which has resulted in partisan polarization among states on the one hand, and a blending of cooperative and coercive tactics at the center (Sharma and Swenden 2018). We argue that oneparty dominance at the central level of government does not necessarily trigger a more centralized polity if it coincides with a constitutional system in which (a) the powers of the states are constitutionally entrenched, thereby guaranteeing state autonomy or self-rule, (b) mechanisms of shared rule, such as a federal second chamber, complement the self-rule attributes of a federal system and (c) the Supreme Court acts as a 'federal safeguard' against the encroachment on state rights.…”

“…However, as shown above, there is little evidence for increasing shared rule in the design or delivery of these programmes. For instance, the NITI Aayog did not increase the cooperative attributes of Indian federalism compared with the Planning Commission (PC) and National Development Council (NDC) which it replaced (Reddy and Reddy 2019;Sharma and Swenden 2018;Swenden 2019;Swenden and Saxena 2017).…”

Understanding multilevel dynamics in India: constituent power and multilevel governance

“…Conversely, the unexpected re-emergence of one-party dominance since 2014 has enabled a partial return to centralization, which somewhat resembles party dominance under the premierships of Indira Gandhi (1966-77; 1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89), both members of the Indian National Congress. Indeed, 'unitary' or 'centralizing' approaches are easier to discern in the unilateral abrogation of the special status of Kashmir (in 2019) or in more vigorous attempts to use the office of the centrally appointed governor to shape state political dynamics (Sharma & Swenden, 2018). These actions may not be 'unconstitutional', but they lay bare the more centralizing features of the Indian constitution.…”