Modernisation of the Armoured Component of the Russian Federation's Ground Forces in the Years 2015–2018. An Outline of the Subject

Abstract

Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and a relatively short period of hegemony of the United States, a period of change led to a clear formation of a new polycentric geopolitical order. The theses about the "end of history" presented by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 did not evolve, although they confirmed closure of the Cold War era. In the first years of the 21st century, especially after the economic crises (2008), the policies of the major states on the international scene increased assertiveness in external relations. This was particularly true of Russia, which-since Vladimir Putin took power on December 31, 1999-focused on the rebuilding of the empire, and marked the boundaries of the failed superpower. The Kremlin's actions resulted in the war with Georgia in 2008, the seizure of the Crimea in 2014, and the intervention in Syria in 2015. In spite of demographic problems, the expansion of Western economic sanctions and relatively low oil and gas prices, which are the main source of income for the country, the 2008 modernisation of the Russian armed forces, was continued. The aim of the paper is to report the latest trends in the scale and scope of modernisation of the armoured component of Russian Ground Forces in the years 2015-2018 and the factors that had a direct impact on current conditions resulting from the emergence of the "new Cold War" in Russia's relations with the West after 2014.

Establishing Effective Reserve Components: Lessons Learned from Russia

“…This can be exemplified through standardization of communication protocols, operational codes, and combat procedures that allow reserve and regular forces to communicate and operate efficiently in conflict situations. For example, NATO's operational doctrines used by member states, including the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) protocol, offer a framework that Indonesia can adopt and adapt to ensure that reservists and regular forces speak the same "language" tactically (Pawlikowicz, 2023).…”