Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and political perspectives.

Abstract

This article reviews three classes of game theoretic solution concepts (solutions, subsolutions, and the core; bargaining set models; and the Shapley value), four social psychological models of coalition formation (minimum resource theory, minimum power theory, bargaining theory, and the weighted probability model), and three sets of political coalition models (minimum size, minimum range, and policy distance minimization). The research that has been conducted on characteristic function games, on experimental coalition situations involving more than three players, and on coalition governments is summarized and the models are evaluated. The advantages of collaboration among the three areas are discussed.

Get angry, get out: The interpersonal effects of anger communication in multiparty negotiation

“…For long, social psychological theories on coalition formation were based on rational choice models predicting how people maximize their own payoffs in coalition formation (Komorita & Parks, 1995;Murnighan, 1978). Recently, research has taken a more motivational approach, stressing that coalition formation is also affected by fairness concerns (Van Beest et al, 2004a, b).…”

Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future

“…A specific research tradition that aims to answer these questions concerns the field of coalition formation (Kahan and Rapoport 1984;Murnighan 1978;Wilke 1985). A leading assumption in coalition formation research is that people aim to maximize their own payoffs and thus that people prefer to form a coalition with few people to a coalition with many people .…”

Do Groups Exclude Others More Readily Than Individuals in Coalition Formation?

“…Early theorizing about coalition formation assumed that people are primarily motivated by self-interest (for a review of coalition theories see Komorita & Parks, 1995;Murnighan, 1978a). Several theories have been proposed, some stressing power differences, others stressing differences in resources, but all assuming that people use these differences to maximize their own payoff (Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 2004b).…”