Models and Logical Consequence

Sagi, Gil

doi:10.1007/s10992-013-9303-5

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…We might extract here a principle regarding logical terms: a term is logical if the machinery required for fixing it is metaphysically acceptable and easy to handle. This principle is in line with approaches by which metaphysical complications should largely be avoided in logic (see Sagi (2014) for examples of such approaches).…”

supporting

confidence: 60%

“…One might worry that even though models remain purely mathematical and generally metaphysically innocent, having them represent possible worlds brings in more metaphysical complications than logic can countenance, just as in the case of representational semantics. However, since we let the interpretation of nonlogical terms vary, the said complications can largely be avoided-if we make the right choice of logical terms (Shapiro, 1998;Sagi, 2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Logicality and Meaning

Sagi

2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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In standard model-theoretic semantics, the meaning of logical terms is said to be fixed in the system while that of nonlogical terms remains variable. Much effort has been devoted to characterizing logical terms, those terms that should be fixed, but little has been said on their role in logical systems: on what fixing their meaning precisely amounts to. My proposal is that when a term is considered logical in model theory, what gets fixed is its intension rather than its extension. I provide a rigorous way of spelling out this idea, and show that it leads to a graded account of logicality: the less structure a term requires in order for its intension to be fixed, the more logical it is. Finally, I focus on the class of terms that are invariant under isomorphisms, as they render themselves more easily to mathematical treatment. I propose a mathematical measure for the logicality of such terms based on their associated Löwenheim numbers.

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confidence: 99%

Logicality and Meaning

Sagi

2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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“…Thus, the alternative Sher offers to metaphysical and to linguistic semantics is ultimately a combination of both. 22 If Sagi is right, metaphysical assumptions are still being dragged in through the backdoor once it is specified what formally possible constructions require. Is there an alternative?…”

Section: Defending (P3)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Incertidumbre Lógica: Pluralismo Lógico y Consecuencia Lógica

Bueno¹

2022

AITÍAS

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It is traditionally thought that logic leaves no room for uncertainty. The validity of arguments and whether a statement is a logical truth or not are typically not issues that invite reasons for doubt. In this paper, I argue that, despite its widespread acceptance, this view is difficult to maintain. I offer two main reasons for this conclusion: (a) In light of the plurality of logics, there are significant disagreements about the validity of arguments. (b) It is similarly difficult to reconcile the view that logic is certain with considerations to the effect that logical consequence, arguably the central concept of logic, cannot be analyzed. The very nature of logical consequence is, thus, open for doubt. After giving some illustrations in support of (a), I discuss a dilemma for the adequacy of any conceptual analysis of logical consequence, in support of (b), and respond to some possible objections. In the end, logic is what it is independently of any certainty. I close with some reflections as to why this is not a bad outcome.

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“…See(Hanson, 1997),(Shapiro, 1998) and(Sagi, 2014).Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 1…”

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confidence: 99%

“… (Shapiro, 1998, 147-8) and(Hanson, 1997, 83).Sher (1996, 668) introduces something she calls 'formal modality', but it is unclear how this notion doesn't just amount to the same as logical or metaphysical possibility; see(Sagi, 2014).11 Biting the bullet,Shapiro (1998, 151) says that '[t]he only conclusion to draw. .…”

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confidence: 99%

Logical Truth

Antonsen¹

2019

AJL

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On the model-theoretic account, a sentence is logically true just in case it is true on all possible semantic interpretations. We dierentiate four ways one can interpret the modality 'possible' in this definition, and argue that one of these readings is not subject to the criticism levelled against the model-theoretic account by Etchemendy. By explicating the four readings we also draw some consequences for what linguistic evidence a selection of logical theories should be sensitive to.

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Models and Logical Consequence

Cited by 5 publications

References 9 publications

Logicality and Meaning

Logicality and Meaning

Incertidumbre Lógica: Pluralismo Lógico y Consecuencia Lógica

Logical Truth

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