2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2012.00339.x
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Modelling the Linkages between Cross‐Compliance and Agri‐Environmental Schemes Under Asymmetric Information

Abstract: Agri-environmental schemes (AESs) and cross-compliance (CC) are the two main components of the common agricultural policy (CAP) that address environmental issues. Under regulation 1698 ⁄ 2005, agri-environmental scheme design has been established in such a way as to use CC as the baseline against which prescriptions and payments are identified. In this framework, agri-environmental payments to farmers are justified only for the component of public goods produced (if any) above the CC prescription level. This c… Show more

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Cited by 39 publications
(33 citation statements)
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References 15 publications
(20 reference statements)
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“…One of the main issues is a joint design of agri-environmental schemes (AES) in order to improve the provision of environmental goods (Bartolini et al 2012). In fact, crosscompliance rules have been set as the baseline for the implementation and quantification of agri-environmental payments, which in turn require additional environmental recommendations (Scheele 2008).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the main issues is a joint design of agri-environmental schemes (AES) in order to improve the provision of environmental goods (Bartolini et al 2012). In fact, crosscompliance rules have been set as the baseline for the implementation and quantification of agri-environmental payments, which in turn require additional environmental recommendations (Scheele 2008).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some authors pointed out that major constraints related to cross-compliance encompass manure spread and the maintenance of permanent pasture, while other constraints are minor (i.e., compliance costs are about 5-10 €/ha) [35,36].…”
Section: Scenario Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to fines, other methods of sanctions that rely on decreasing the marginal gain of illicit activities are also available in forest law enforcement systems, such as confiscation of produce or means of production [29], or conditioning access to public credit on compliance with (environmental) law [35]. As such, it is possible to model illegal deforestation in the Amazon as:…”
Section: Enforcement Of Law Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%