Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools

Cechlárová, Kataŕına; Fleiner, Tamás; Manlove, David F.; McBride, Iain; Potpinková, Eva

doi:10.1007/s10100-014-0356-5

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…3 This is the case, for example, in France (Terrier, 2014), Germany, Czech Republic (Cechlárová, Fleiner, Manlove, McBride and Potpinková, 2015), Italy (Barbieri, Rossetti and Sestito, 2011), Turkey (Dur and Kesten, 2014), Mexico (Pereyra, 2013), Peru, Uruguay (Vegas, Urquiola and Cerdàn-Infantes, 2006), and Portugal. 4 In practice, several other criteria used to determine teacher priorities might also reflect broader social objectives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

Combe

Tercieux

Terrier

2022

The Review of Economic Studies

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To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

Combe

Tercieux

Terrier

2022

The Review of Economic Studies

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“…The authors report that CCAS have been successfully implemented in recent years in a number of countries including France, Germany, Turkey, Peru, Portugal, and Ecuador. For additional evidence on the benefits of CCAS for teacher assignment systems see, for example, Pereyra (2013); Terrier (2014); Cechlárová et al (2015); Dur and Kesten (2019); Combe et al (2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Potential of Smart Matching Platforms in Teacher Assignment: The Case of Ecuador

Elacqua¹,

Gómez²,

Krussig³

et al. 2022

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This paper studies the potential of personalized "smart" information interventions to improve teacher assignment results in the context of a centralized choice and assignment system (CCAS) in Ecuador. Specifically, we focus on the impact that a personalized non-assignment risk warning, coupled with a list of "achievable" teaching position recommendations, had on teacher applications in the “I Want to Become a Teacher” selection process. We study the causal effect of the intervention on teachers school choices, assessing its impact on the equilibrium probability of being assigned and on the overall results of the selection process, both in terms of the percentage of filled vacancies and the selection scores of as- signed teachers. We find that treated teachers, in equilibrium, are much more likely to modify their application and obtain an assignment. This result highlights the potential of similar information interventions in other contexts. We furthermore present evidence that the intervention led to increased overall assignment rates and selection scores.

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“…Thus we suppose that each school has different capacity for each subject and that it will be willing to employ a set of teachers in such a way that these capacities will not be exceeded. Cechlárová et al [8] studied a variant of this problem where the tranee-teachers could only express which schools are acceptable for them and which not without ordering them according to their preferences and the schools had no say. In these settings, the aim was to assign as many trainee-teachers as possible (ideally all of them) by respecting the schools capacities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stable matchings of teachers to schools

Cechlárová

Fleiner

Manlove

et al. 2016

Theoretical Computer Science

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Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by a particular characteristic of the education system in many countries where each teacher specializes in two subjects. We seek stable matchings, which ensure that no teacher and school have the incentive to deviate from their assignments. Indeed we propose two stability definitions depending on the precise format of schools' preferences. If the schools' ranking of applicants is independent of their subjects of specialism, we show that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if there are only three subjects, unless there are master lists of applicants or of schools. By contrast, if the schools may order applicants differently in each of their specialization subjects, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete even in the presence of subject-specific master lists plus a master list of schools. Finally, we prove a strong inapproximability result for the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs with respect to both stability definitions.

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Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools

Cited by 10 publications

References 17 publications

The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

The Potential of Smart Matching Platforms in Teacher Assignment: The Case of Ecuador

Stable matchings of teachers to schools

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