Modelling Elections in the Caucasus

Schofield, Norman; Gallego, María; Jeon, Jee Seon; Muskhelishvili, Marina

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1938392

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…In this respect, this paper is closely related to Schofield et al (2012), who demonstrate that it is possible for relatively autocratic regimes to persist, even when there are democratic elections and viable opposition parties. In addition, the examination of the Argentine case nicely aligns with the recent analyses of the role of valence in explaining the country's politics (Galiani et al, 2014;Schofield and Cataife, 2007;Schofield and Levinson, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

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An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)

Micozzi

Saiegh²

2015

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Argentine politics from 1955 to 1966 was characterized by the conflict between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists. While each camp could veto the other's project, neither could advance their own agenda. In his canonical interpretation, O'Donnell (Modernization and BureaucraticAuthoritarianism. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973) concluded that party democracy during this era was tantamount to an 'impossible game.' While we recognize the significance of O'Donnell's analysis, we believe that it presents a number of problems. To address its main shortcomings we consider a spatial model that emphasizes the importance of voters' judgments about the characteristics of party leaders. We recover the positions of Argentine parties using a mixed logit stochastic model and an original dataset of recorded votes in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies during this era. Our results suggest that the electoral logic forced the Peronist party to adopt relatively radical positions away from the center in order to maximize its support. In turn, non-Peronist parties had little incentive to seek the support of moderate, and thus 'unrepresented,' Peronist voters by locating themselves at the electoral mean. In particular, valence differences associated with Peronism prevented larger parties from converging toward the center. We thus conjecture that the rules of the impossible game were a constraint imposed by the populace on Argentine political elites rather than a choice made by the latter behind the people's back.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…We recover political parties’ positions in Argentina using a mixed logit stochastic model (Schofield, 2008b; Schofield and Zakharov, 2010; Schofield et al, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2011f, 2012). In the standard empirical estimation, party valences are assumed to be the constant terms of the voter utility functions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)

Micozzi

Saiegh²

2015

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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“…We use the postelection survey conducted by GORBI-GALLUP International from March 19 through April 3, 2008, to built a formal model of the 2008 election in Georgia (see [ 42 ]). The factor analysis done on the survey questions determined that there were two dimensions describing voters' attitudes towards democracy and the west.…”

Section: Mnl Models Of the Elections Of Various Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We organized a small preelection survey of 2010 election in Azerbaijan allowing us to construct a model of the election (see [ 42 ]). For VHP and AVP, the estimation of their party positions was very sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of one respondent.…”

Section: Mnl Models Of the Elections Of Various Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems

Gallego

Schofield

2013

The Scientific World Journal

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Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral valence. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c. It has been shown that high values of c imply that there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. We used electoral surveys to construct a stochastic valence model of the the elections in various countries. We find that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries with similar regimes, and across political regimes. In some countries, the centripetal tendency leads parties to converge to the electoral mean. In others the centrifugal tendency dominates and some parties locate far from the electoral mean. In particular, for countries with proportional electoral systems, namely, Israel, Turkey, and Poland, the centrifugal tendency is very high. In the majoritarian polities of the United States and Great Britain, the centrifugal tendency is very low. In anocracies, the autocrat imposes limitations on how far from the origin the opposition parties can move.

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Modelling Elections in Post Communist Polities: Voter Perceptions, Political Leaders and Activists

Schofield

2011

SSRN Journal

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Modelling Elections in the Caucasus

Cited by 3 publications

References 66 publications

An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)

An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)

The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems

Modelling Elections in Post Communist Polities: Voter Perceptions, Political Leaders and Activists

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