Modelling Cyber Attacks on Electricity Market Using Mathematical Programming With Equilibrium Constraints

Abstract

With the development of communication infrastructure in smart grids, cyber security reinforcement has become one of the most challenging issues for power system operators. In this paper, an attacker is considered a participant in the virtual bidding procedure in the day-ahead (DA) and realtime (RT) electricity markets to maximize its profit. The cyber attacker attempts to identify the optimal power system measurements to attack along with the false data injected into measurement devices. Towards the maximum profit, the attacker needs to specify the relation between manipulated meters, virtual power traded in the markets, and electricity prices. Meanwhile, to avoid being detected by the system operator, the attacker considers the physical power system constraints existing in the DA and RT markets. Then, a bilevel optimization model is presented which combines the real electricity market state variables with the attacker decision-variables. Using the mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints, the presented bilevel model is converted into a single level optimization problem and the optimal decision variables for the attacker are obtained. Finally, simulation results are provided to demonstrate the performance of the attacker, which also provides insights for security improvement. INDEX TERMS Cyber-security, electricity market, false data injection, mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints.

Stochastic Up to Congestion Bidding Strategy in the Nodal Electricity Markets Considering Risk Management

“…Constraint (10) provides the lower and upper bounds of the UTC bidding capacity on each path, which are specified to avoid the potential unbounded solutions when solving the optimization problem. The properties of the non-increasing UTC bidding curve are taken into account in constraints (11) and (12). Constraint (11) means that the values of , , and , , should be equal if the UTC bidding prices in scenario and are the same.…”

“…Constraint (11) means that the values of , , and , , should be equal if the UTC bidding prices in scenario and are the same. Constraint (12) ensures that UTC bidding curve is non-increasing, which indicates the UTC bidding capacity decreases with the DA transmission price of the path, and in this circumstance, if the expected DA transmission price on the path is too high, the corresponding UTC bidding capacity might be zero.…”

“…The authors of [10] established an equilibrium model to investigate the characteristics of the FTR holders with virtual transactions. In [11] and [12], an analytical framework and a bi-level optimization model were developed for the cyber attacker with virtual transactions, respectively, and it was shown that the associated virtual bids might bring risks to the power system.…”

“…In [14] and [15], stochastic virtual transaction models were developed for a financial participant and a solar power producer, respectively, where the electricity prices were characterized using autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models. In [16], the authors proposed a data-driven [4], [6], [7], [9], [11] and [12] INC offer and DEC bid Deterministic [5], [8], [10], and [13]- [16] INC offer and DEC bid Stochastic [2] and [3] INC offer, DEC bid and UTC transaction Deterministic virtual bidding strategy by using an online learning algorithm, where the Sharpe ratio was used to measure its performance. The literature on virtual bidding were summarized in Table I, and it is shown most of the existing research work just focus on the INC offers and DECs used at the nodes, while the UTC transactions used on the paths have not been studied in detail.…”

Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS): A Review on Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis With Cyber Security Applications

“…The authors did extensive research on the analysis of different types of cyber-attacks like denial-of-service attack, false data injection attack, and man-in-the-middle attack in CPPS and shown the jeopardize of stability [35][36][37]. To protect the complex power grid control networks of CPPS, it is necessary to perform the risk and vulnerability assessment under cyber-attacks [38][39][40]. The various methods of risk [41][42][43][44] and vulnerability assessment [45][46][47][48] from the component level to systemwide impacts, with cyber model assessment and physical model assessment, are performed.…”