Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Parliamentary Government Formation

Abstract

That neither the assumptions nor the predictions of standard government formation models entirely correspond to empirical findings has led some to conclude that theoretical accounts of government formation should be reconsidered from the bottom up. We take up this challenge by presenting a zero-intelligence model of government formation. In our model, three or more parties that care about office and policy make random government proposals. The only constraints that we impose on government formation correspond to the two binding constitutional constraints that exist in all parliamentary systems: an incumbent government always exists and all governments must enjoy majority legislative support. Despite its deliberately limited structure, our model predicts distributions over portfolio allocation, government types, and bargaining delays that approach those observed in the real world. Our analysis suggests that many formation outcomes may result from the institutional foundation of parliamentary democracies, independent of the strategic behavior of party leaders.

The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

“…Our analysis also connects to the literature on leader selection (e.g., Hamermesh andSchmidt 2003, Besley andReynal-Querol 2011). Importantly, we further contribute a generic econometric model of elections wherein there is a nomination process at one level and an endorsement vote at another (also see Glasgow et al 2012 andGolder et al 2012).…”

Recent debates and advances in the scholarly examination of presidential institutions

“…In particular, we can observe a consensual perspective of authors on the importance of presidential constitutional power for government formation (see also Golder et al, 2012). Yet, for studies on the dismissal of prime ministers or termination of cabinets, the arguments and results seem to be more diverse.…”

Platforms, Portfolios, Policy: How Audience Costs Affect Social Welfare Policy in Multiparty Cabinets

“…With the aid of a formal bargaining model provided in Section A of the Appendix, we identify the conditions that lead to policy stability and change. We predict that in a situation where a social affairs minister is presented with a proposal 8 There is a large formal (Diermeier 2006) and empirical (Glasgow, Golder, and Golder 2011;Golder, Golder, and Siegel 2012) literature on government formation. It is beyond the scope of our paper to predict how electoral platforms affect government formation.…”