Modeling resource flow asymmetries using condensation networks

Abstract

This paper analyzes the asymmetries with regard to the resources obtained by groups of players in equilibrium networks. We use the notion of condensation networks which allows us to partition the population into sets of players who obtain the same resources and we order these sets according to the resources obtained. We establish that the nature of heterogeneity plays a crucial role on asymmetries observed in equilibrium networks. Our approach is illustrated by introducing the partner heterogeneity assumption into the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal [1].

FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND THE PATTERN OF R&D COLLABORATIONS

“…Consequently, if some firms add links, then other firms may remove some of their links, including the most 15. In the theoretical literature on network formation, several papers examine this type of heterogeneity (see, i.e., Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst 2005;Sarangi 2011, 2013). valuable links.…”

“…In the theoretical literature on network formation, several papers examine this type of heterogeneity (see, i.e., Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst ; Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi , ).…”

On the Interaction between Small Decay, Agent Heterogeneity and Diameter of Minimal Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Model: A Note

“…1 See Galeotti et al (2006), Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011), Haller, Kamphorst, and Sarangi (2007), Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2012), Charoensook (2015), Charoensook (2019) 2 While little is known about the role of value heterogeneity in Two-way flow network of nonrival information, there are quite some studies on the role of value heterogeneity in other types of network formation model. For works related to one-way flow network, see Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2013), Galeotti (2006), and Derks and Tennekes (2009). For works related to network formation model that requires mutual consent, see Persitz (2009) and Cofre (2016) which assumes the absence of information decay.…”