Modeling of Distributed Generators Resilience Considering Lifeline Dependencies During Extreme Events

Krishnamurthy, Vaidyanathan; Kwasinski, Alexis

doi:10.1111/risa.13326

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(47 reference statements)

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“…Although batteries might still be able to service the cell site improving the resilience, typical battery backup times in cell sites are only a few hours (typically 4 h), which is a time scale much shorter than the expected duration of the event. Analysis with buffers at cell sites have also been performed but since this present work focuses on grid side modelling, instead of load side modelling, and the model of buffers requires a long discussion, such study has been left for a different publication found in [59]. The post-WMD grid dynamic simulation procedure is described as the following algorithm:…”

Section: Power Grid Resilience Model Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalised resilience models for power systems and dependent infrastructure during extreme events

et al. 2020

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This study presents a generalised critical infrastructures resilience model for extreme events with a focus on power grids. Infrastructures are modelled as three domains-physical, cyber, and human. Each domain is described with respect to the services it provides. Each domain is represented by geometric graphs for each service it provides. The resilience models use geometric graphs with each graph's nodes and edges characterised based on relevant attributes. This study also discusses various applied aspects related to resilience models including the impact of changing operating environment, human-driven processes, such as logistics, and service buffers. Due to their stated particular importance in the U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 21, particular attention is placed on the power infrastructure and its impact on the public communication infrastructures as a main critical load. This study focuses on the multi-time scale power system operation to capture cascading outages within, and subsequently to its dependent infrastructure-the public communication system (e.g. wireless or 'cellular' communication networks) as a main critical load. This study illustrates the merits of the proposed models in calculating resilience in extreme events and derives physical domain representation for electric and communication systems using cell tower and substation data from the USA.

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Section: Power Grid Resilience Model Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalised resilience models for power systems and dependent infrastructure during extreme events

et al. 2020

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“…Other prevention studies include Ouyang and Dueñas‐Osorio (2014) assessing the resilience of power systems in hurricane‐prone regions. Krishnamurthy and Kwasinski (2019) explored how distributed generators could be used to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure such as cell phone sites. Especially prominent in academic research are microgrid reliability evaluation and investment planning models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual and Collective Strategies to Limit the Impacts of Large Power Outages of Long Duration

2021

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As modern society becomes ever more dependent on the availability of electric power, the costs that could arise from individual and social vulnerability to large outages of long duration (LLD-outages) increases. During such an outage, even a small amount of power would be very valuable. This article compares individual and collective strategies for providing limited amounts of electric power to residential customers in a hypothetical New England community during a large electric power outage of long duration. We develop estimates of the emergency load required for survival and assess the cost of strategies to address outages that last 5, 10, and 20 days in either winter or summer. We find that the cost of collective solutions could be as much as 10 to 40 times less than individual solutions (less than $2 per month per home). However, collective solutions would require community-wide coordination, and if local distribution system lines are destroyed, only individual back-up systems could provide contingency power until those lines are repaired. Costs might be reduced if more robust distributed generation were employed that could be operated continuously with the ability to sell power back to the grid. Our cost-effectiveness analysis only assesses what could be done, developing estimates of preparedness cost. A decision about what should be done would require additional input from a range of stakeholders as well as some form of analytical deliberative process.

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Simulation of social resilience affected by extreme events in ancient China

Delang

Zhou

et al. 2021

Climatic Change

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Modeling of Distributed Generators Resilience Considering Lifeline Dependencies During Extreme Events

Cited by 7 publications

References 41 publications

Generalised resilience models for power systems and dependent infrastructure during extreme events

Generalised resilience models for power systems and dependent infrastructure during extreme events

Individual and Collective Strategies to Limit the Impacts of Large Power Outages of Long Duration

Simulation of social resilience affected by extreme events in ancient China

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