Model Based Importance Analysis for Minimal Cut Sets

Böde, Eckard; Peikenkamp, Thomas; Rakow, Jan; Wischmeyer, Samuel

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-88387-6_27

Cited by 13 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Whereas in the approach of [6J only minimal cut sets are generated, we generate complete fault trees. Contrary to [6], we support PAND-gates and provide a justification for the causality model used. Work documented in [5J uses the Halpern and Pearl approach to determine causality for counterexamples in functional CTL model checking.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 58%

From Probabilistic Counterexamples via Causality to Fault Trees

Kuntz

Leitner-Fischer

Leue

2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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In recent years, several approaches to generate probabilistic counterexamples have been proposed. The interpretation of stochastic counterexamples, however, continues to be problematic since they have to be represented as sets of paths, and the number of paths in this set may be very large. Fault trees (FTs) are a well-established industrial technique to represent causalities for possible system hazards resulting from system or system component failures. In this paper we suggest a method to automatically derive FTs from counterexamples, including a mapping of the probability information onto the FT. We extend the structural equation approach by Pearl and Halpern, which is based on Lewis counterfactuals, so that it serves as a justification for the causality that our proposed FT derivation rules imply. We demonstrate the usefu lness of our approach by applying it to an industrial case study.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 58%

From Probabilistic Counterexamples via Causality to Fault Trees

Kuntz

Leitner-Fischer

Leue

2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…This case study of a train odometer system is taken from [21]. The train odometer system consists of two independent sensors used to measure the speed and position of a train.…”

Section: Train Odometer Controllermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These approaches also lack a justification of the causality model used. Our work extends and improves on the approach of [21] in the following ways: We use a single set of system modeling and specification languages, namely PRISM and CSL. Whereas in the approach of [21] only minimal cut-sets are generated, we generate complete fault trees.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic fault tree synthesis using causality computation

Leitner-Fischer

Leue

2013

IJCCBS

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In recent years, several approaches to generate probabilistic counterexamples have been proposed. The interpretation of probabilistic counterexamples, however, continues to be problematic since they have to be represented as sets of paths, and the number of paths in this set may be very large. Fault trees (FTs) are a well-established industrial technique to represent causalities for possible system hazards resulting from system or system component failures. In this paper we extend the structural equation approach by Pearl and Halpern, which is based on Lewis counterfactuals, so that it can be applied to reason about causalities in a state-action trace model induced by a probabilistic counterexample. The causality relationships derived by the extended structural equation model are then mapped onto fault trees. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by applying it to a selection of case studies known from literature.

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“…what is the probability of a critical system failure. They rely on stochastic models, quantitative approximations and/or Markov-chains/processes [8] [9][10] [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for Qualitative and Quantitative Formal Model-Based Safety Analysis

Güdemann

Ortmeier

2010

2010 IEEE 12th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering

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In model-based safety analysis both qualitative aspects (i.e. what must go wrong for a system failure) and quantitative aspects (i.e. how probable is a system failure) are very important. For both aspects methods and tools are available. However, until now for each aspect new and independent models must be built for analysis. This paper proposes the SAML framework as a formal foundation for both qualitative and quantitative formal modelbased safety analysis. The main advantage of SAML is the combination of qualitative and quantitative formal semantics which allows different analyses on the same model. This increases the confidence in the analysis results, simplifies modeling and is less error-prone.The SAML framework is tool-independent. As proof-ofconcept, we present sound transformation of the formalism into two state of the art model-checking notations. Prototypical tool support for the sound transformation of SAML into PRISM and MRMC for probabilistic analysis as well as different variants of the SMV model checker for qualitative analysis is currently being developed.

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Model Based Importance Analysis for Minimal Cut Sets

Cited by 13 publications

References 9 publications

From Probabilistic Counterexamples via Causality to Fault Trees

From Probabilistic Counterexamples via Causality to Fault Trees

Probabilistic fault tree synthesis using causality computation

A Framework for Qualitative and Quantitative Formal Model-Based Safety Analysis

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