Modal dispositionalism and necessary perfect masks

Vetter, Barbara; Busse, Ralf

doi:10.1093/analys/anab061

Cited by 5 publications

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References 34 publications

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“…. After submitting this paper I learned that Barbara Vetter and Ralf Busse provide a structural diagnosis of the kind of problem I discuss in Sections 1-2 (seeVetter & Busse 2022). They distinguish three types of potential solutions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Extended Dispositionalism and Determinism

Werner

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Modal dispositionalists hold that dispositions provide the foundation of metaphysical necessity and possibility. According to the kind of modal dispositionalism that can be found in the present literature, a proposition p is possible just in case some things are disposed to be such that p. In the first part of this paper I show that combining this classic form of dispositionalism with the assumptions that the laws of nature are necessary and deterministic and that all dispositions are forward-looking in time leads to the unattractive conclusion that every truth is necessary. I argue that the classic dispositionalist should be troubled by this result and in the second part of the paper I suggest a novel variant of dispositionalism that avoids it. This extended form of dispositionalism allows that some propositions are only indirectly underwritten by dispositions.

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confidence: 99%

Extended Dispositionalism and Determinism

Werner

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution

Johansen

2024

Acta Anal

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Dispositional accounts of various phenomena have claimed that dispositions can be intrinsically masked. In cases of intrinsic masking, something has a disposition while also having an intrinsic property that would prevent that disposition from manifesting in the face of its stimulus. This paper develops a theory of disposition ascriptions capable of recognizing such dispositions. The theory is modeled on the view that dispositions are powers. I propose that having a disposition is a matter of exerting a corresponding kind of influence. Unlike powers theories, however, the account largely falls silent on questions of fundamental metaphysics. It does not build dispositions into fundamental ontology, posit necessary connections between properties, or otherwise appeal to sui generis modality.

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Dispositions and Powers

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Kimpton‐Nye

2023

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As we understand them, dispositions are relatively uncontroversial 'predicatory' properties had by objects disposed in certain ways. By contrast, powers are hypothetical 'ontic' properties posited in order to explain dispositional behaviour. Chapter 1 outlines this distinction in more detail. Chapter 2 offers a summary of the issues surrounding analysis of dispositions and various strategies in contemporary literature to address them, including one of our own. Chapter 3 describes some of the important questions facing the metaphysics of powers including why they're worth positing, and how they might metaphysically explain laws of nature and modality.

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Modal dispositionalism and necessary perfect masks

Cited by 5 publications

References 34 publications

Extended Dispositionalism and Determinism

Extended Dispositionalism and Determinism

Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution

Dispositions and Powers

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