2016
DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1162777
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Mobilizing moral boundaries: the politics of derivatives reform in the US

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Cited by 11 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Recent insights from political economy suggest that the mobilization of outsider groups as a ‘countervailing force’ had significant effects on the regulatory design of post‐crisis financial reforms (Clapp and Helleiner,; Kastner, ;Orban, ; Pagliari and Young,; Woolley and Ziegler,). Given the public outcry and emerging popular pressures in response to the financial crisis, recent efforts on the part of scholars to explain regulatory change pay surprisingly little attention to newly mobilizing societal groups as change agents.…”
Section: Theoretical Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recent insights from political economy suggest that the mobilization of outsider groups as a ‘countervailing force’ had significant effects on the regulatory design of post‐crisis financial reforms (Clapp and Helleiner,; Kastner, ;Orban, ; Pagliari and Young,; Woolley and Ziegler,). Given the public outcry and emerging popular pressures in response to the financial crisis, recent efforts on the part of scholars to explain regulatory change pay surprisingly little attention to newly mobilizing societal groups as change agents.…”
Section: Theoretical Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Applying his theory to post-crisis politics, Culpepper (2011: 197) predicted 'a weakened bargaining position' for organized interests in a 'radically changed political environment' and 'under intense public scrutiny'. Accordingly, scholars found that the financial crisis and the public outrage it caused was a catalyst in changing interest group dynamics that at least temporarily weakened the financial sector (Baker 2010;Clapp and Helleiner 2012;Kastner 2014;Orban 2016;Steinlin and Trampusch 2012;Woll 2013;Young 2013). How, then, can we explain the lobbying success of financial industry groups on a highly salient issue such as the FTT?…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%