Mobilizing memories: The social conditions of the long-term impact of victimization

Abstract

Recent research has focused on the legacies of civil war violence on political preferences, finding that wartime victimization decreases support for the perpetrator or its political identity in the long run. However, we know little about the conditions under which this effect takes place. Historical accounts from civil wars suggest that the long-term effect of violence is not homogenous, nor consistent across areas within a single conflict. Addressing this gap, this article explores the effects of wartime victimization on long-term political preferences at the local level, looking at the conditioning effect of the local social context. In particular, I argue that the effect of wartime violence depends on the existence of local networks that create and maintain memories of the violence and capitalize on them for future mobilization. This argument is tested in the context of the Spanish Civil War. I build a novel dataset using archival data, historical secondary sources, and already existing datasets, covering 2,100 municipalities across Spain. In line with the argument, it is found that Francoist wartime victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote share after democracy was restored four decades later, but mainly in those municipalities where clandestine, left-leaning political networks were active after the conflict.

Legacies of Resistance: Mobilization Against Organized Crime in Mexico

“…The shared experience of high-risk mobilization can forge and consolidate strong social relationships loaded with a sense of mutual trust, and this trust can be transmitted from one generation to the next (Dohmen et al, 2011; Ljunge, 2014; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). Such networks play important roles in the sharing and protection of information necessary for organized resistance (Finkel, 2015), and help sustain collective memories that facilitate mobilization later on (Villamil, 2020). Social networks also shape collective notions of threat critical for mobilization decisions (Shesterinina, 2016, p. 422).…”

Wartime Experiences and Popular Support for Peace Agreements: Comparative Evidence from Three Cases

“…Bracketed in our study—and a fruitful avenue for further research—is how past violence may be used by present-day political elites (c.f. Villamil 2020). Indeed, a follow-up to our study would be to delve into each of these cases to examine whether and how, over time, wartime victimization and participation have been memorialized and politicized and with what effect on popular perceptions, including views on peace agreements.…”

“…A long-standing body of research has shown that experiences of violence shape people’s political behavior and attitudes even long after a conflict ends (e.g., Dyrstad et al 2011; Brounéus 2014; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Nussio and Oppenheim 2014; Hall et al 2018; Hong and Kang 2017; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016)—even across generations (e.g., Balcells 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Costalli and Ruggeri 2019; Villamil 2020). 2 Warfare is likely to generate both psychological and material grievances: trauma or disability from one’s own experiences of violence (either as a victim or perpetrator or both), the loss and victimization of loved ones, and loss of one’s home and income (e.g., Justino 2009; Gates et al 2012).…”

Social Cohesion, Economic Security, and Forced Displacement in the Long-Run: Evidence from Rural Colombia

“…One possibility is that in testing for the effects of 'victimization' , broadly conceived, researchers are masking substantial heterogeneity among different types of victimization experiences. For instance, there is mixed evidence that suggests victimization effects can change over time (Balcells, 2012;Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013;Villamil, 2020). The context in which victims find themselves can also moderate the impact of victimization: scholars have documented how wars can create "hierarchies of victimhood" that make some victims more likely to mobilize and participate than others (Berry, 2017) and that patterns of rebel governance can impede or mobilize victim activism (e.g.…”