Mobility, Targeting, and Private-School Vouchers

Abstract

This paper uses general-equilibrium simulations to explore the role of residential mobility in shaping the impact of different private-school voucher policies. The simulations are derived from a three-district model of low-, middle-, and high-income school districts (calibrated to New York data) with housing stocks that vary within and across districts. In this model, it is demonstrated that school-district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to non targeted vouchers but vastly different from vouchers targeted to low-income households. Furthermore, strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs.

Capitalization and the Voucher: An Analysis of Precinct Returns from California's Proposition 174

“…First, to illustrate the basic effect of the voucher on housing prices, we have made a number of simplifying assumptions about the housing market, the most important of which is that houses in the two communities are identical. Nechyba (2000) has analyzed the more realistic case, in which the housing stock is heterogeneous, but reaches essentially the same conclusions.…”

“…Because the voucher opens new options for families, it may affect this relationship between value and quality. Nechyba (2000) analyzed this issue in the context of a computable, general equilibrium model.…”

Measuring educational efficiency at student level with parametric stochastic distance functions: an application to Spanish PISA results

“…Last but not least, there is the role of educational institutions, which are nowadays considered the main explanatory factor for observed international differences in student achievement. This is particularly the case for institutions with a system that favors homogeneity in classroom composition, by means such as tracking students at an early age (Hanushek and Wossmann 2005) or allowing private-public school competition (Nechyba 2000).…”

Why Do Education Vouchers Fail at the Ballot Box?

“…In this discrete choice regime, households can opt out of public education, sending their children to private schools instead, albeit at their own cost. 2 Other work on education vouchers includes Nechyba (1999Nechyba ( , 2000, Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003,2005), Ferreyra (2007), and Bearse, Glomm, and Ravikumar (2000).…”