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Alspector-Kelly, Marc

doi:10.1023/a:1010353825006

Cited by 18 publications

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“…In doing so, however, one should at least adopt Amanda Bryant's distinction between the "emulation thesis" (Bryant 2020b, 47) of methodological naturalism that philosophy should adopt the methods of science (here denoted "methodological naturalism") and the "implementation thesis" (2020b, 48) of methodological naturalism that philosophy should defer to the findings of science (here denoted "ontological naturalism"). particular, no distinctly philosophical perspective" (Hylton 1994, 267; see also Gibson 1992;Alspector-Kelly 2001). This, then, is why the realism is unquestionable and unqualified: "[T]o defuse the threat of the question whether our scientific system of the world … might nevertheless fail to be true, Quine must insist that the questioner cannot occupy a position which is wholly outside our system of the world" (Hylton 1994, 267).…”

Section: T H E Qu I N Ea N Con N Ect Ionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rather, both the robust realism and the naturalized epistemology float from Quine's broader naturalism (as also indicated by Haack [1993]). As Peter Hylton summarizes the point, “What is crucial to Quine's naturalism is the negative point, that there is no theoretical perspective other than the general perspective of natural science—and, in particular, no distinctly philosophical perspective” (Hylton 1994, 267; see also Gibson 1992; Alspector‐Kelly 2001). This, then, is why the realism is unquestionable and unqualified: “[T]o defuse the threat of the question whether our scientific system of the world … might nevertheless fail to be true, Quine must insist that the questioner cannot occupy a position which is wholly outside our system of the world” (Hylton 1994, 267).…”

Section: The Quinean Connectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Mark Alspector‐Kelly (2001), Huw Price (2009), and Gideon Rosen (2014), among others, point out, Quine's “robust realism” is, however, in consequence a deflationary metaphysics in disguise. Quine seems to be largely in agreement with Rudolf Carnap's (1950) deflationary view of metaphysics, the only difference being Quine's rejection of pluralism and insistence on the preference of the scientific framework.…”

Section: The Quinean Connectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Naturalized metaphysics in the image of Roy Wood Sellars and not Willard Van Orman Quine

Jaksland

2024

Metaphilosophy

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The naturalized metaphysics promoted by Ladyman and Ross, among others, is often described as (neo)‐Quinean metaphysics. This association with Quine's naturalism can, however, give a misleading impression of the aims and commitments of this kind of naturalized metaphysics. Contrary to Quine, these naturalized metaphysicians endorse metaphysical realism and offer wholesale arguments in favor of the epistemic standing of science‐based metaphysics. Accordingly, this naturalized metaphysics comes closer to Roy Wood Sellars's evolutionary naturalism, especially since the theory of evolution is central to the criticism that naturalized metaphysics levels at nonnaturalized metaphysics. The paper argues that Sellars's naturalism is furthermore helpful (1) for explicating the naturalism of naturalized metaphysics, (2) for theorizing a more general naturalist basis for naturalized metaphysics, and (3) for suggesting where naturalized metaphysics is perhaps not naturalist enough, especially when it comes to considering the implications of the theory of evolution for its positive program.

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Section: T H E Qu I N Ea N Con N Ect Ionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Quinean Connectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Quinean Connectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Naturalized metaphysics in the image of Roy Wood Sellars and not Willard Van Orman Quine

Jaksland

2024

Metaphilosophy

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“…In the literature, there has been some confusion regarding what Carnap wants to conclude regarding platonism and nominalism given his E/I distinction. John Burgess (2004) takes Carnap to defend platonism; Gallois (1998) takes seriously the possibility that Carnap really is a nominalist (and Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001) argues that this was also Quine's understanding of Carnap); still others would see Carnap rather as dissolving the debate than as taking sides. I do not see how there can be any serious discussion about what Carnap's views really were.…”

Section: External and Internal Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carnap and Ontological Pluralism∗*

Eklund

2009

Metametaphysics

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My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external andinternal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap̓s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I turn to some interrelated arguments against the pluralist view. The arguments are not demonstrative. Some possible escape routes for the pluralist are outlined. But I think the arguments constitute a formidable challenge. There should be serious doubt as to whether the pluralist view, as it emerges after discussion of these arguments, will be worth defending. Moreover, there is an alternative ontological view which equally well subserves the motivations underlying ontological pluralism.

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Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction

Verhaegh

2016

Erkenn

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Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former's internalexternal distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine's metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine's own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine's perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine's position is much closer to Carnap's than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects.

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Cited by 18 publications

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Naturalized metaphysics in the image of Roy Wood Sellars and not Willard Van Orman Quine

Naturalized metaphysics in the image of Roy Wood Sellars and not Willard Van Orman Quine

Carnap and Ontological Pluralism∗*

Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction

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