Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration: a comment

Cárdenas, Oscar

doi:10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00394.x

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…And they consider the privatization of the downstream subsidiary while we consider the privatization of the upstream subsidiary. 4 Hotelling model is quite popular in analyzing mixed oligopoly market, see for example Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse (1991), Cardenas (2007), Heywood and Ye (2009), Inoue, Kamijo, and Tomaru (2009), Shuai (2017, and Kitahara and Matsumura (2013) .…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model

Chen¹,

Shuai

2017

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:This paper examines a different way of privatization from existing literature. In a mixed duopoly Hotelling type model in which the public firm consists of multiple subsidiaries, instead of privatizing the public firm as its entirety, the government may privatize only one of the subsidiaries (for example the manufacturing subsidiary). We find that this kind of privatization always improves social welfare comparing to no privatization at all. And comparing to privatizing the public firm in its entirety, privatizing only the manufacturing subsidiary always results in larger consumer welfare and results in larger social welfare when transport cost or R&D cost is sufficiently large.

show abstract

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model

Chen¹,

Shuai

2017

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…More recent work by Kitahara and Matsumura () introduces elastic demand to the mixed‐duopoly Hotelling model. Different from these works assuming firms engaging in Betrand competition, Cardenas () assumes that firms engage in Cournot competition in a Hotelling‐type model. What distinguishes our paper from existing literature is that we allow the two firms, public and private, to engage in subcontracting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed Duopoly with Subcontracting

Shuai

2014

Manage. Decis. Econ.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Existing literature on mixed oligopoly focuses on competition among different types of firms but ignores their possible cooperation. We allow cooperation between a public firm and a private firm through subcontracting in a Hotelling mixed-duopoly model. We find that when subcontracting is possible, the equilibrium without subcontracting is not socially optimal because subcontracting can lower total production costs. And if both firms engage in subcontracting, the existence of a public firm can guarantee the first best equilibrium, whether it is the low-cost firm or not. But when a private firm is the low-cost firm, it is more profitable for it to choose vertical foreclosure. And the consequent equilibrium is not socially desirable anymore.

show abstract

A comment on mixed oligopoly spatial model: the non-uniform consumer distribution

Shuai

2016

Econ Theory Bull

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration: a comment

Cited by 6 publications

References 5 publications

Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model

Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model

Mixed Duopoly with Subcontracting

A comment on mixed oligopoly spatial model: the non-uniform consumer distribution

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About