Mitigation of peer‐to‐peer overlay attacks in the automatic metering infrastructure of smart grids

Abstract

be accessed by numerous external subjects for different purposes, ranging from billing to grid monitoring. Therefore, to prevent the disclosure of personal information through the analysis of energy consumption patterns, the metering data must be securely handled. Peer-to-peer networking is a promising approach for interconnecting communication nodes among the automatic metering infrastructure to efficiently perform data collection while ensuring privacy and confidentiality, but it is also prone to various security attacks. This paper discusses the impact of the most relevant peer-to-peer attack scenarios on the performance of a protocol for privacy preserving aggregation of metering data. The protocol relies on communication gateways located in the customers’ households and interconnected by means of a variant of the Chord overlay. We also propose some countermeasures to mitigate the effects of such attacks: we integrate a verifiable secret sharing scheme based on Pedersen commitments in the aggregation protocol, which ensures data integrity, with compliance checks aimed at identifying the injection of altered measurements. Moreover, we introduce Chord auxiliary routing tables to counteract the routing pollution performed by dishonest nodes. The paper evaluates the computational complexity and effectiveness of the proposed solutions through analytical and numerical results

Smart grid security enhancement by detection and classification of non‐technical losses employing deep learning algorithm

“…For example, consider the work of 20‐25 to focus on outline detection by abnormal patterns in the load curve by intrusion identification. This method has advantages like safety operation, reliability in detection, and classification of electricity theft from their load curve and connected load.…”

Lightweight and Privacy-Friendly Spatial Data Aggregation for Secure Power Supply and Demand Management in Smart Grids

“…However, aggregation in the presence of node failures as well as the methodology to construct the aggregation tree have not been explicitly addressed. In addition, as shown in [15], the schemes presented in [13], [14] cannot ensure privacy during smart metering and reveal the identity of the users. Also, the public key signatures used in these schemes result in higher computation cost.…”

“…Also, the public key signatures used in these schemes result in higher computation cost. A few more homomorphic encryption based schemes have been proposed in [15]- [19]. However, in these schemes, the smart meter is not authenticated during data aggregation.…”

Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering with Authentication in a Smart Grid

“…However, the schemes are all constructed on the basis of public key based homomorphic encryption such as Paillier's encryption, which may incur much higher computational overhead on resource-limited meters compared to the symmetric approach in smart grid networks, or do not guarantee data integrity and sender authentication. Fengjun et al [25] and Rottondi et al [26] proposed data aggregation schemes which ensure data integrity, but they cannot preserve user privacy during smart metering.…”