‘Mitigation banks’ for wetland conservation: a major success or an unmitigated disaster?

Abstract

First developed in the USA in the early 1970s, 'wetland mitigation banks' provide a framework for conservation activities that are designed to offset residual, unavoidable damage to the natural environment caused by development activities. The concept is now a worldwide phenomenon. In this paper I consider the level of success of wetland mitigation banks in the USA for biodiversity conservation with a view to informing 'best practice' in Australia. I conclude that although the concept has merit, even in the USA where the processes have been evolving for over 30 years, the outcomes frequently fall short of the target of a 'like for like' swap of habitat. While the outcome for wetland mitigation may not be an 'unmitigated disaster' it is, at best, apparently only modestly successful.

Restoring degraded landscapes: Assessing the utility of biodiversity offsets for the business sector in Africa

“…The ongoing offset initiatives by Rio Tinto in various countries in Africa demonstrate responsible leadership in this domain. While biodiversity offsetting may be achieved through non-market approaches, most theorists accept that a market approach, involving trading in offset 'credits', is most likely to take offsetting to another scale, streamline planning processes, reduce transaction costs and make the most meaningful contribution to national conservation priorities (Burgin, 2010;Doswald et al, 2012  The possibility of more in situ conservation activities than would ordinarily occur if developers were not encouraged to offset their impacts on biodiversity;  A way to ensure better conservation outcomes by offsetting degradation of natural habitat of relatively low biodiversity value for conservation or restoration of high biodiversity value habitat (e.g. focusing on ecological corridors and priority sites) and by trading small, highly compromised sites for larger areas of habitat where conservation outcomes are more secure;  The chance to internalise environmental 'externalities' and integrate biodiversity conservation into the investment plans of companies;  Increased 'regulatory goodwill' which can lead to faster licensing and permitting;  Better access to capital as financiers now want to see clear environmental management plans;  Lower costs of compliance with regulations as companies address these in advance of the development activity; and  Maximize strategic economic opportunities in emerging markets (for instance, establishing companies to implement offsets).…”

“…Under most offset instruments in Africa, these conditions are usually less clear (Quetier & Lavorel, 2011;ICMM, 2013). Burgin (2010) argues that it is difficult to argue ecological equivalence between biodiversity components that differ in type, location, time, or ecological context. When the offsets are required to protect particular species or habitats, the task is easier.…”

Where is the avoidance in the implementation of wetland law and policy?

“…It has also spurred a lively debate over whether the mitigation sequence of avoid, minimize, and compensate is an effective approach for managing wetland habitats within a no net loss framework. For example, Burgin (2010) suggests that ''the outcome for wetland mitigation may not be an 'unmitigated disaster' but it is, at best, modestly successful'' (p. 53), and Murphy et al (2009b) go so far as to say that ''mitigation activities continue what can only be described as a 'cockeyed optimist' approach to aquatic resources permittingone that is destined to lead to further deterioration of the nation's aquatic resource base' ' (p. 3112). Given that many jurisdictions have adopted the mitigation sequence as a means to achieve a no net loss of wetlands, it is critical that we begin to better understand the key factors that lead to the pervasive tendency to skip-over avoidance.…”

“…While there are clearly enforcement problems in many jurisdictions, there is also a growing need for ''back-end'' monitoring to ensure that compensation sites are performing adequately and are meeting the conditions set out in the permit. The list of studies documenting non-compliance in the United States is long (for example, see Reiss et al 2009;Brown and Veneman 2001;Turner et al 2001;Zedler and Callaway 1999), and clearly articulate the general failure of permit holders to replace wetland functions through off-site compensation (Burgin 2010;Cole and Shafer 2002;Malakoff 1998;Roberts 1993;Spieles 2005;Zedler 1996). The lack of government oversight to follow-up and ensure that the conditions of approvals for wetland losses are met over an appropriate timeframe reinforces the preference for compensation over avoidance; if permit holders are not held accountable, then compensation is much easier and economical than avoidance.…”

“…Despite the continued reliance on this sequence in wetland decision making, there is broad agreement among scholars, scientists, policymakers, regulators, and the regulated community that the first and most important step in the mitigation sequence, avoidance, is ignored more often than it is implemented (Burgin 2010;ELI 2009;Hough and Robertson 2009;Murphy et al 2009a). While many studies have shown that compensatory laws and policies have not been effective in maintaining wetland area and function (for example, Spieles 2005;Cole and Shafer 2002;NRC 2001;Malakoff 1998;Roberts 1993;Zedler 1996), and often have unintended social impacts (see BenDor et al 2008;BenDor et al 2007;Ruhl and Salzman 2006), few explicate why these laws and policies have failed, or suggest alternative approaches to regulating and managing wetland impacts.…”