Mistake of Fact and Change Of Position: Sound Advice from the Privy Council? (<i>Dextra Bank &amp; Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica</i>)

Bant, Elise; Creighton, Peter

doi:10.1080/14729342.2002.11421417

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Therefore, supporters of both the de-enrichment and those of the irreversibility approach concerning how to understand detrimental change of position should have no complaint that this condition obtains here. On this, see Bant (2009 , pp. 126ff.).…”

Section: The Benefits Are No Longer Herementioning

confidence: 99%

“…These three defenses can be understood as change of position defenses of unjust enrichment actions. 10 This defense was recognized by Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman as follow: “At present, I do not wish to state the principle any less broadly than this: that the defense is available to a person whose position has so changed that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require him to make restitution, or alternatively to make restitution in full” ( Bant 2009 , p. 125). One might think that the bona fide purchase defense also applies.…”

Section: Defenses Against the Duty Of Restitutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Climate Justice and the Duty of Restitution

Borgogno

2022

Moral Philosophy and Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Much of the climate justice discussion revolves around how the remaining carbon budget should be globally allocated. Some authors defend the unjust enrichment interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). According to this principle, those states unjustly enriched from historical emissions should pay. I argue that if the BPP is to be constructed along the lines of the unjust enrichment doctrine, countervailing reasons that might be able to block the existence of a duty of restitution should be assessed. One might think that the duty to provide restitution no longer has moral weight if many benefits were already consumed, if the particular benefits obtained from historical emissions cannot be transferred from one country to another, or if present members of developed countries framed their life plans based upon the expectation of continued possession of those benefits. I show that none of these reasons negate the duty to provide restitution.

show abstract

Section: The Benefits Are No Longer Herementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Defenses Against the Duty Of Restitutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Justice and the Duty of Restitution

Borgogno

2022

Moral Philosophy and Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…122 Elise Bant and Peter Creighton argue that the decision would be defensible as barring a claim in failure of consideration, but relief in mistake should not be so restricted. 123 The BoJ thought there was a currency purchase; Dextra thought it was a loan. It is reminiscent of the case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus 124 where there was no contract because the parties were, unbeknownst to each other, referring to entirely different ships with the same name.…”

Section: (Iii) Implications For the Common Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mistake, Failure of Consideration and the Planning Theory of Intention

Sheehan¹

2015

Can. J. Law Jurisprud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recovery of mistaken payments in the law of restitution is often justified by reference to a vitiated intention and that of payments where there is a failure of consideration by reference to a qualified intention. This paper aims to investigate whether this is a misleading characterisation and suggests that both causes of action should be understood in terms of conditions affecting our intentions. Specifically we should look at the failure of our planning agency, and Michael Bratman’s theory of agency in particular. In cases of mistaken payments we should look at the failure of a background condition to the payment. In such cases to fail to allow recovery is to fail to respect me as an autonomous actor, acting under norms having agential authority for me. In failure of consideration cases the autonomy of the other party is at stake, but we can take this into account by positing not a failure of a condition affecting personal intention, but affecting collective intention. There are different views on what collective intention is and how it should be understood, which may themselves have different implications in terms of the concurrency of mistake and failure of consideration as unjust factors. The paper examines different ways in which collective intentions might fail and how they fit the failure of consideration paradigm

show abstract

Mistake of Fact and Change Of Position: Sound Advice from the Privy Council? (Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica)

Cited by 2 publications

References 1 publication

Climate Justice and the Duty of Restitution

Climate Justice and the Duty of Restitution

Mistake, Failure of Consideration and the Planning Theory of Intention

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About