Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for Development

The European Union and Policy Coherence for Development: Reforms, Results, Resistance

“…It was then in the mid-2000s that the EU shifted gear, considering that between 1993 and 2005 very little progress could be recorded, partly because of lack of interest of most Member States and partly because of clashes within the European Commission itself (Hoebink, 2004;Carbone, 2008). In the context of an ambitious project to federate the policies of the Member States, not only on 'more and better aid', the European Commission proposed 'coherence for development commitments' in 12 policy areas: trade; environment; climate change; security; agriculture; fisheries; social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work; migration, research and innovation; information society; transport; energy (European Commission, 2005).…”

“…The overall meagre record by the EU, in spite of the various reforms proposed and adopted over the years, is due to three interlinked types of resistance; so much so that the pursuit of PCD has been portrayed as a 'mission impossible' for whoever attempts it (Carbone, 2008) -not to mention the fact that the number of PCD champions has decreased over the years. But before we examine each of them in turn, one general observation must be made: the EU is good at setting normative frameworks, but its compliance record generally does not match its ambitions.…”

“…Clearly, this old dividing line has lost relevance, not least because the development agenda has substantially widened (Janus et al, 2015). The problem is that not only do different policy communities not necessarily share the same goals -and, of course, in a pluralistic system certain degrees of incoherence are unavoidable -but also that clashes occur with the development domain itself, most notably on the concept of development and its policy implications (Forster and Stokke, 1999;Ashoff, 2005;Carbone, 2008). Policy coherence resonates with the more established concept of coordination, but while coordination is necessary for tackling complex problems, coherence is not an automatic product of coordination (Di Francesco, 2001;May et al, 2005;Peters, 2015).…”

“…The argument that making public policies more developmentfriendly serves the EU's own interest in the long-term offers little consolation at times in which the EU's socio-economic model is under considerable stress. The fact that the direct beneficiaries of PCD are located in foreign countries and that the development constituency -mainly consisting of committed politicians and bureaucrats and some NGOs -is far too weak in relation to other interest groups mean that the needs and interests of developing countries tend to succumb (Ashoff, 2005;Carbone, 2008). 7 The second type of resistance is linked to the EU architecture, most notably the co-existence of intergovernmental and supranational policies.…”

“…7 The second type of resistance is linked to the EU architecture, most notably the co-existence of intergovernmental and supranational policies. Most studies on PCD tend mainly to highlight the opposition from Member States (Egenhofer et al, 2006;Hoebink, 2004;Carbone, 2008;Stroß, 2014). Their different views on what international development means and implies affects the way in which they deal with intergovernmental (e.g.…”