Missing Links in Party-System Polarization: How Institutions and Voters Matter

Curini, Luigi; Hino, Airo

doi:10.1017/s0022381611001721

Cited by 75 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Implicitly, the importance of congruence for SWD is recognised in the many studies showing that voters whose preferred parties win in elections are more satisfied (Anderson & Guillory 1997;Blais et al 2015;Singh 2014). How policy considerations affect SWD is also addressed directly in some prominent studies (Curini & Hino 2012;Dahlberg & Holmberg 2014;Ezrow & Xezonakis 2011;Kim 2009), but inevitable data limitations have constrained these to the general left-right axis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multidimensional government-citizen congruence and satisfaction with democracy

Stecker

Tausendpfund

2016

European Journal of Political Research

110

101

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In the first comparative study of multidimensional government‐citizen policy congruence, this article shows that citizens are less satisfied with democracy when their views differ from that of the government on policy dimensions beyond the general left‐right axis. Satisfaction is reduced by a government that deviates on European integration and redistribution and partly also on social lifestyle, immigration and environmental protection. Furthermore, this analysis identifies the level of political interest as central moderator of this relationship. Satisfaction of citizens with stronger interest in politics suffers more when there is a politically distant government. Combining data from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey and two waves of the European Social Survey, the analysis builds on information on citizen‐government policy congruence of some 45,000 citizens and 31 governments in 15 Western and Central Eastern European countries. The article brings a multidimensional perspective to the study of policy congruence between citizens and governments in a time when the preference structure of parties and citizens has become increasingly complex.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multidimensional government-citizen congruence and satisfaction with democracy

Stecker

Tausendpfund

2016

European Journal of Political Research

110

101

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“…That is, party k can be modeled as being stuck (to a varying degree) to a specific party location for various reasons, for example, fear of losing reputation among electors, uncertainty about popular preferences, activists' concern for established ideology, etc. (Curini and Hino 2105;Budge 1994;Plümper and Martin 2008). When this happens, in the final Nash configuration of party positions, the position of party k can be expressed as: fixed · (1 − γ) + nash · γ, where nash is the optimal party position when that party is free to move and fixed is the "stuck" party position.…”

Section: R>mentioning

confidence: 99%

Nash Optimal Party Positions: The nopp R Package

Curini¹,

Iacus²

2017

J. Stat. Soft.

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“…The ultimate goal of most political parties and their leaders is undoubtedly to control both executive and legislative branches, although the appeal of and the competition for the presidency often occupies a higher priority (Curini and Hino 2012). This implies that presidential contests often spill over to legislative elections (Huang and Wang 2014).…”

Section: Implications For the Quality Of Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

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Missing Links in Party-System Polarization: How Institutions and Voters Matter

Cited by 75 publications

References 43 publications

Multidimensional government-citizen congruence and satisfaction with democracy

Multidimensional government-citizen congruence and satisfaction with democracy

Nash Optimal Party Positions: The nopp R Package

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

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