Misrepresenting consciousness

Weisberg, Josh

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3

Cited by 33 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…In traditional HOT (90,122,131,132), the content of the HOR is talked about as "I thoughts" (133) and is postulated to have something like the content "I am in state x." For example, if one were consciously seeing red then the higher-order state would have the content "I am seeing red."…”

Section: A Modified Higher-order Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

LeDoux

Brown

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

436

417

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Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.uch progress has been made in conceptualizing consciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand, have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits (the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is defined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higherorder states are essential for emotional experiences.Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of "fear." We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define "fear" as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1-6). These "basic emotions" are typically proposed to be wired into the brain's limbic system (7). Although the limbic sy...

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Section: A Modified Higher-order Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

LeDoux

Brown

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

436

417

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“…Some have argued, however, that the HOA is more likely a thought that one is in the relevant state [1,7,8]. Still others have urged that the HOA is internal to the state one is aware of [9,10], though most see the HOA as distinct from the state it makes one aware of.…”

Section: Higher-order Theories Of Conscious Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Rosenthal

2012

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.

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“…Higher-order thought (HOT) theorists argue that consciousness-issuing HORs are conceptual, i.e. they are thoughts about their lower-order targets (Rosenthal, 2005;Lau, 2008;Weisberg, 2010). 2 Originally EHOR theory was characterized as a kind of monitoring.…”

Section: Preliminary Distinctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories

Picciuto

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher-order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher-order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness-of-grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have.

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Misrepresenting consciousness

Cited by 33 publications

References 38 publications

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories

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