Misperception influence on zero-determinant strategies in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Cheng, Zhaoyang; Chen, Guanpu; Ye, Hong

doi:10.1038/s41598-022-08750-8

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…, which is the same as the equalizer strategy in IPD games [16,39]. , which is consistent with the result in MTD problems [27].…”

Section: B Existence Of Zd Strategysupporting

confidence: 86%

Zero-Determinant Strategy in Stochastic Stackelberg Asymmetric Security Game

Cheng¹,

Chen²,

Ye³

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the attacker may be a boundedly rational player, who adopts a combination of the BR strategy and a fixed stubborn one. In such a condition, the SSE strategy may not maintain the defensive performance due to the stubborn element. In this paper, we focus on how the defender can adopt the unilateral-control zero-determinate (ZD) strategy to confront the boundedly rational attacker. At first, we verify the existence of ZD strategies for the defender. We then investigate the performance of the defender's ZD strategy against a boundedly rational attacker, with a comparison of the SSE strategy. Specifically, when the attacker's strategy is close to the BR strategy, the ZD strategy admits a bounded loss for the defender compared with the SSE strategy. Conversely, when the attacker's strategy is close to the stubborn strategy, the ZD strategy can bring higher defensive performance for the defender than the SSE strategy does.

show abstract

“…, which is the same as the equalizer strategy in IPD games [16,39]. , which is consistent with the result in MTD problems [27].…”

Section: B Existence Of Zd Strategysupporting

confidence: 86%

Zero-Determinant Strategy in Stochastic Stackelberg Asymmetric Security Game

Cheng¹,

Chen²,

Ye³

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Equation ( 2) is satisfied for any decision profile 𝒙, UAV 𝑖, and unilateral deviation 𝑥 𝑖 ′ ∈ Θ 𝑖 , which indicates that the change of individual UAV's utility is aligned with the change of the global objective 7 . In view of this, the optimization of UAV's own profit will result in the improvement of the whole team's performance.…”

Section: Problem Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As game theory involves the interaction behaviors of different decision makers [5][6][7] , employing game models to discuss interactive mechanism between UAVs have attracted extensive research. One of the natural representative solution concepts in game theory is Nash equilibrium (NE), which characterizes the set of stable points that rational players would decide not to deviate from [8][9][10] .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient deployment in UAV from the perspective of distributed potential games

Guan

Zhao

Liu

2023

International Conference on Computer Application and Information Security (ICCAIS 2022)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this work, we investigate the efficient distributed deployment design for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication systems. A game-theoretic framework is proposed to describe the interactions among UAVs. Specifically, a distributed potential game is modeled, where the decision actions of each UAV are chosen from the complex local set, and are not known by other UAVs. In order to solve this, we first employ inscribed polyhedrons to approximate UAVs’ local sets, so as to convert the original projection operation into a quadratic program subproblem. Then we design a discrete algorithm with a distribute scheme for ϵ-Nash equilibrium seeking, in which each UAV generates a local estimate action profile for other UAVs and exchanges this information with its neighbors through the communication network. Finally, we show the performance of the proposed algorithm via various numerical examples.

show abstract

“…Moreover, whether players have motivations to explore the different cognitions among them is a crucial question in security games. It was also widely discussed in References 12,13 . Concretely, if the different cognitions have little influence on players' profits, revealing or utilizing the cognitive differences will not bring players benefits, and then players may not have motivations to explore the fact even if they realize the existence of different cognitions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Leader-follower security games in UAV communication with deception

He¹,

Gao

Guan

et al. 2022

Third International Conference on Computer Science and Communication Technology (ICCSCT 2022)

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we study the leader-follower Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) security game with deception. The robustness under the UAV game with deception describes the model’s ability to maintain players’ profits. We propose a UAV security model with one-leader and multi-followers and define the Deception Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (DSSE) in the game with deception. Besides, we analyze the robustness of the DSSE to find the boundary that the leader cannot improve its utility from deception.

show abstract

Misperception influence on zero-determinant strategies in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Cited by 9 publications

References 43 publications

Zero-Determinant Strategy in Stochastic Stackelberg Asymmetric Security Game

Zero-Determinant Strategy in Stochastic Stackelberg Asymmetric Security Game

Efficient deployment in UAV from the perspective of distributed potential games

Leader-follower security games in UAV communication with deception

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About