2020
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2020.1772848
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Minsky’s moment? The rise of depoliticised Keynesianism and ideational change at the Federal Reserve after the financial crisis of 2007/08

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Cited by 11 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…While, to some extent, stress testing may also serve an epistemic function of sensitizing banks and other financial institutions to systemic risk(s) (Coombs 2020), its main attraction (for central banks) certainly lies in the fact that stress tests function as a sort of 'performative measurement' (Coombs 2020, 526): by communicating assessment criteria 'transparently', central banks can incentivize financial institutions to conform to them and produce measurable performances of central banks' regulatory success. This allows central banks to demonstrate their agency as regulators, and to frame 'financial stability as a discrete objective addressed by specific instruments', so that 'financial stability now augments (rather than replaces or amends) the inflation-targeting model of central banking' (Levingston 2021(Levingston , 1475 as a complementary but functionally separate task (Levingston 2021;Thiemann 2019). As a result, the initially announced 'macro-prudential revolution' has been 'reduced to a much more scaled back incremental approach during the process of implementation.…”
Section: The Advent Of 'Unconventional' Monetary Policy and Its Conse...mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…While, to some extent, stress testing may also serve an epistemic function of sensitizing banks and other financial institutions to systemic risk(s) (Coombs 2020), its main attraction (for central banks) certainly lies in the fact that stress tests function as a sort of 'performative measurement' (Coombs 2020, 526): by communicating assessment criteria 'transparently', central banks can incentivize financial institutions to conform to them and produce measurable performances of central banks' regulatory success. This allows central banks to demonstrate their agency as regulators, and to frame 'financial stability as a discrete objective addressed by specific instruments', so that 'financial stability now augments (rather than replaces or amends) the inflation-targeting model of central banking' (Levingston 2021(Levingston , 1475 as a complementary but functionally separate task (Levingston 2021;Thiemann 2019). As a result, the initially announced 'macro-prudential revolution' has been 'reduced to a much more scaled back incremental approach during the process of implementation.…”
Section: The Advent Of 'Unconventional' Monetary Policy and Its Conse...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It renders a more reflexive governance, and organizational and social learning about the origins of crises more difficult by committing technical agencies to increasingly ritualistic pursuits of formally rational goals even while the broader structural conditions within which these tasks acquired a more substantive rationality may be eroding. As has been the case with central banking since the GFC, 'rather than opening space for a discussion about the "social purpose" … rising political turbulence [may] actually strengthen … normative commitment to de-politicisation' (Levingston 2021(Levingston , 1479. In this way, the dependence of technical agency on measurable performance(s) may work to perpetuate, and even deepen, the entanglement of this agency in the production of the very structural problems that erode its felicity conditions.…”
Section: Conclusion: How Normalizing 'Unconventional' Policies De-pol...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In PPA scholarship, institutional and ideational analysis helps to examine the preferences and interests of key policy actors, the role of ideas across the policy cycle, asymmetrical power relations among policy actors, and the effect of these relations on the politics of ideas (Béland, 2019;Derthick & Quirk, 1985). Similarly, extensive IPE scholarship recognizes that, in addition to structural, institutional, or interest-based factors, ideas are consequential for social, political, and economic phenomena (Blyth, 2002;Campbell, 1998;Hall, 1989;Levingston, 2020;Nelson, 2017). The Turkish case highlights the critical role powerful politicians' ideas play in constraining central bank policy space and reducing credible commitment (North & Weingast, 1989).…”
Section: Evolving Ipe and Ppa Research On Central Bankingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In doing so, the ECB completely disregarded that the success of such monetary policy innovations depends on banks' funding models which otherwise weakens the effectiveness of the policy tool . Levingston (2021) has also identified a particular reading of Keynesian ideas as being dominant within the Fed after the financial crisis. He finds that Keynesian ideas were made compatible with pre-crisis policymaking which resulted in 'depoliticized Keynesianism', which led to a selective interpretation of Keynesian and Minsky scholarship (Levingston, 2021).…”
Section: State Of the Artmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Levingston (2021) has also identified a particular reading of Keynesian ideas as being dominant within the Fed after the financial crisis. He finds that Keynesian ideas were made compatible with pre-crisis policymaking which resulted in 'depoliticized Keynesianism', which led to a selective interpretation of Keynesian and Minsky scholarship (Levingston, 2021). Thus, ideas can enable institutional change, but they can also be an important force in preserving the status quo.…”
Section: State Of the Artmentioning
confidence: 99%