Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies

Abstract

One of the most important decisions coalition partners make when forming a government is the division of ministries. Ministerial portfolios provide the party in charge with considerable informational and agenda-setting advantages, which parties can use to shape policies according to their preferences. Oversight mechanisms in parliaments play a central role in mitigating ministerial policy discretion, allowing coalition partners to control each other even though power has been delegated to individual ministers. However, we know relatively little about how such mechanisms influence the agenda-setting and gatekeeping powers of ministers and how much influence minister parties have on policy output relative to the government as a whole in different institutional settings. We fill this gap by analyzing original data on over 2000 important social and economic policy reform measures adopted in nine Western European countries over 20 years, based on a coding of more than 1200 country reports issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We find that parliaments with strong oversight powers constrain the agenda-setting capacity of minister parties but have limited impact on their gatekeeping capacity. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of policy-making and democratic accountability.

Pathways to policy integration: a subsystem approach

“…In the case of homeland security in the USA, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, politicized domestic security and resulted in the establishment of policy integration capacities dealing with this important problem. There are different ways in which this process may unfold: In political systems where the head of government has a high level of discretion over specialized policy communities, it is more likely that there are policy proposals that create integrative policy capacities, spanning across sectors (Alexiadou, 2015 ; Bäck et al, 2021 ; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014 ; Timmermans, 2006 ). In a context where the head of government has less room to maneuver, other actors might play an important role in pushing policy solutions that span across different policy subsystems.…”

“…In political systems where the head of government has a high level of discretion over specialized policy communities, it is more likely that there are policy proposals that create integrative policy capacities, spanning across sectors (Alexiadou, 2015 ; Bäck et al, 2021 ; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014 ; Timmermans, 2006 ).…”

Cabinet Reshuffles and Parliamentary No-Confidence Motions

“…A prime minister, as leader of the cabinet, typically delegates primary responsibility for policymaking in specific areas to individual ministers (Strøm 2000). This gives ministers considerable policy influence in their own jurisdiction (Alexiadou 2015(Alexiadou , 2016Bäck et al 2022). As a result, potential agency problems may beset the relationship between prime ministers and their ministerial teams, including adverse selection and moral hazard (see Lupia 2003).…”

Who’s fit for the job? Allocating ministerial portfolios to outsiders and experts

“…For the benefit of theoretical clarity, we thus put forward our hypotheses with respect to the two dimensions independently of each other. policy outcomes (Alexiadou, 2016;Bäck et al, 2022). Appointing outsiders will therefore produce outcomes further away from a party's ideal point (and that of its voters).…”