Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market

Finkelstein, Abby Basya

doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(04)00043-x

Cited by 19 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The literature has identified minimum standard regulation with restricting insurers to guarantee a minimum wealth in case of the bad outcome for the Neudeck and Podczeck (1996), Encinosa (2001), Finkelstein (2004. We also studied this alternative regulation and our findings still hold (see Appendix C for details).…”

Section: Minimum Coverage Regulationmentioning

confidence: 71%

Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets

McFadden

Noton

Olivella

2015

SERIEs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks while the rest attract the low risks, all at positive profits. Hence individuals, regardless of their type, "subsidize" insurers. If the legislation is sufficiently stringent the equilibrium is pooling, all insurers just break even and low risks subsidize high risks. None of these results require resorting to non-Nash equilibrium notions.

show abstract

Section: Minimum Coverage Regulationmentioning

confidence: 71%

Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets

McFadden

Noton

Olivella

2015

SERIEs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…), the corresponding standard and some exogenous variables that affect the unconstrained value of the control variable (F * in the notation of equation (16)). However, in order to accommodate more complex or less straightforward regulations such as the minimum standards on health insurance coverage analyzed in [9] or the safety standards examined in [30], different formulations would be necessary.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is evident that in the early 1980s, among major manufacturers, Ford and General Motors were non-compliant, and could only satisfy the regulations by using credits earned by complying in some years to offset shortfalls in others. Others had to pay fines for exceeding the standard 9 , while since 1990 there have been some occasions when some firms were penalized for noncompliance. , fuel prices and the corresponding CAFE standard.…”

Section: R T Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…emission permits, versus command-andcontrol standards [16]; or aspects of regulatory enforcement such as whether compliance can be maximized through targeting firms [17,20] or self-reporting [29], how to define penalties for noncompliant firms [24] or whether to warn them before imposing fines [34]. Extending the investigation to health insurance markets, Finkelstein [9] examined the empirical evidence of the effect of binding minimum standards on the market for voluntary private health insurance for the elderly in the US.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On the Role of Regulatory Standards: Specification and Some Empirical Evidence from Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy

Zachariadis

2007

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper proposes a simple model to evaluate the role of regulatory controls. It is formulated so as to enable drawing empirical conclusions on the basis of usual hypothesis tests. Three potential roles of standards are examined: they can act as penalties for non-compliant firms, as norms to which all firms converge, and as controls with cumulative impact over time. I test this specification focusing on automobile fuel economy (CAFE) standards that have been imposed in the US since 1978, using annual data from each major auto manufacturer. Results show that CAFE rules, functioning mainly as penalties, have been an important determinant of car fuel consumption. The hypothesis that standards acted also as norms is rejected. Finally, the automobile industry as a whole became less constrained by regulations over the years because of stagnating CAFE standards since 1990 and progress in vehicle technology.

show abstract

“…This market is highly standardized at the federal level, but there are state regulations that are similar to rate and issue laws in the two markets described previously. While these laws make comparisons between Medigap plans easier, research shows they have decreased the proportion of individuals with Medigap coverage (Finkelstein 2004). This type of finding points to the need for continued research using state policy data in this market.…”

Section: Nongroup Private Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

Data Needs for Policy Research on State-Level Health Insurance Markets

Simon¹

2008

INQUIRY

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Private and public health insurance provision in the United States operates against a backdrop of 50 different regulatory environments in addition to federal rules. Through creative use of available data, a large body of research has contributed to our understanding of public policy in state health insurance markets. This research plays an important role as recent trends suggest states are taking the lead in health care reform. However, several important questions have not been answered due to lack of data. This paper identifies some of these areas, and discusses how the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality could push the research agenda in state health insurance policy further by augmenting the market-level data available to researchers. As states consider new forms of regulation and assistance for their insurance markets, there is increased need for better warehousing and maintenance of policy databases.Americans face a patchwork of different markets providing health insurance. These markets, be they private or public, are governed by several sets of regulations enacted at the state as well as federal level. The variation that exists in policies, particularly at the state level, has spawned a large literature assessing the policies' impacts on health insurance and related outcomes. Yet several new questions could be answered if additional market-level data were collected. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has an opportunity to further the research by facilitating the creation of such resources. In this paper, I briefly review the available market-level data, 1 research questions that have been explored with these measures, and identify additional questions that could be answered with new data. This paper begins with a review of the different segments of markets for health insurance. Regulating Private vs. Public Health InsuranceThe private insurance market consists of two separate domains-group and nongroup markets-which are further split in the manner shown in Figure 1. To convey a sense of the relative sizes of some of these components, in 2004 about 161.5 million individuals (or 63.3% of all nonelderly Americans) held employer health insurance, while 11.2% of the nonelderly held coverage through Medicaid/State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 2.3% held Medicare/Tricare coverage, 5.4% had directly

show abstract

Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets

Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets

On the Role of Regulatory Standards: Specification and Some Empirical Evidence from Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy

Data Needs for Policy Research on State-Level Health Insurance Markets

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About