Mimesis versus simulation: Contemporary dream theory and the nature of dream mentation.

Abstract

By forwarding a mimetic theory of dream mentation, this paper critiques two important current theories of dreaming-the Continuity Hypothesis and Social Simulation Theory. The Continuity Hypothesis (CH) holds that dreams are continuous with waking concerns. Social Simulation Theory (SST) postulates dream simulations select waking materials that allow dreamers to rehearse interpersonal skills and bonds instrumental for species survival. Using data from a study of undergraduate American dreamers, this paper argues the story-like dreams that tend to occur in REM sleep neither merely continue waking concerns, nor merely replicate the social bonds that help to make life meaningful. Rather, dreamers think mimetically about the cultural models through which people understand waking concerns and social bonds by copying visual metaphors for models that circulate in a social world and altering these images. The paper defines mimesis as an image-based form of thinking in which simulation of an image specifies a topic and variations represent thought about this topic. This idea about the nature of dream mentation casts new light on bizarreness in dreams. From a mimetic perspective, bizarreness is extreme visual variation and variation from slight to extreme is intrinsic to dream mentation. When images are realistic verisimilitude indicates they are not the focus of dream thinking. SST posits that social perception, social communication, and social behaviors are simulated in dreams. A mimetic perspective shows such simulations supply subjects for dream thinking while variations raise questions about the fidelity of perceptions as well as about the meanings of communications and behaviors.

Reply to Mageo (2019): Four assertions I did not make about dreams.

“…Professor Mageo (2019, p. 374) wrote that I “admit that over half of simulated humans in dreams have bizarre features,” an assertion that is based on a citation to a chapter on realistic simulation and bizarreness in dreams; the citation to this chapter also includes a citation to the work of three activation-synthesis theorists (Kahn, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002). In effect, the neurocognitive theory is said to be similar to theirs, which is the opposite of what is claimed in the cited chapter (Domhoff, 2007).…”

“…Professor Mageo (2019, p. 372) made the general and seemingly neutral assertion that in the neurocognitive theory “bizarreness and other dream features that appear discontinuous with waking life may be a product of what he calls ‘figurative thinking.’” This statement is vague enough (“may be”) that it could be said of many dream researchers, but the article gives the impression that the neurocognitive theory of dreams claims such instances are frequent. However, the sources that are cited for the neurocognitive view on this issue make clear that very little if any figurative thinking (including metaphoric expressions) had been found in empirical studies of dream content up to that point (Domhoff, 2003, pp.…”

“…This reply explains how Professor Jeannette Mageo (2019) mischaracterized the neurocognitive theory of dreams in four seemingly small but important ways. She did so in the process of claiming that a mimetic theory of dreaming, with mimesis defined as “image-based, visual thinking,” is more useful than the neurocognitive theory and two other theories as well (Mageo, 2019, p. 371).…”

“…This reply explains how Professor Jeannette Mageo (2019) mischaracterized the neurocognitive theory of dreams in four seemingly small but important ways. She did so in the process of claiming that a mimetic theory of dreaming, with mimesis defined as “image-based, visual thinking,” is more useful than the neurocognitive theory and two other theories as well (Mageo, 2019, p. 371). These mischaracterizations are relevant because they blur the differences between the neurocognitive theory and the two other theories of dreaming that are discussed in Professor Mageo’s article.…”

“…In an article claiming that a mimetic theory of dreaming (with mimesis defined as “image-based, visual thinking”) is superior to the neurocognitive theory of dreams, 4 assertions are attributed to me that I did not make. The article states that I “admit that over half of simulated humans in dreams have bizarre features,” claim there is a considerable amount of figurative thinking in dreams, and believe that “How frequently an event occurs in waking life, according to the continuity hypothesis (CH), can predict the frequency of a similar dream event; the frequency of waking concerns and thoughts is predictive of subsequent dream content” (Mageo, 2019, pp. 371–372).…”