MILP Based Differential Attack on Round Reduced WARP

Kumar, Manoj; Yadav, Tarun

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95085-9_3

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…in ¼ 0x0076 0000 0000 0000 0000 c000 00c6 0000 Γ 7 out ¼ 0x0000 000c 0200 0000 0000 100c 0060 0000 in ¼ 0xa000 005a 00f 0 00aa 0000 0000 5000 005f Γ 19 out ¼ 0x0000 0005 0000 0a0a 0000 0005 00f 0 00a0 2 −66 149,447 2 −120:01 20 Γ 20 in ¼ 0x5000 00aa 0050 00b5 0000 0000 f 000 00a5 Γ 20 out ¼ 0x0000 a50a a050 0000 0005 0a0a fa00 0000 The results show that there are at least 64,242 trails within the linear hull with a fixed correlation 2 −72 . These findings provide insights into the clustering effect and distribution of trails within linear hulls for different rounds of WARP.…”

Section: Roundmentioning

confidence: 99%

SAT-Based Security Evaluation for WARP against Linear Cryptanalysis

Shi,

Liu,

2023

IET Information Security

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WARP, an efficient lightweight block cipher presented by Banik et al., offers a viable alternative to AES with its 128-bit block and a 128-bit key. It adopts a 32-nibble type-II generalized Feistel network (GFN) structure, incorporating a nibble permutation optimized for both security and efficiency. Notably, WARP has achieved the lowest hardware implementation among 128-bit block ciphers. Its bit-serial encryption-only circuit is only 763 gate equivalents (GEs). Consequently, WARP has received significant attention since its inception. The designers evaluated the number of active Sboxes for linear trails in WARP to establish its security. To further investigate WARP’s resistance against linear attacks, we employed an automated model to analyze the optimal linear trails/hulls of WARP. To achieve this, the problem will be transformed into a Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT). The constraints in conjunctive normal form (CNF) are used to describe the mask propagation of WARP and invoke the SAT solver to find valid solutions. The results allowed us to obtain the optimal correlation of the initial 21-round linear trails for WARP. Furthermore, by enumerating the linear trails within a linear hull, the distribution of linear trails is revealed, and the probability of the linear hull is improved to be more accurate. This work extends the linear distinguisher from 18 to 21 rounds. Additionally, the first independent analysis of WARP’s linear properties is presented, offering a more precise evaluation of its resistance against linear cryptanalysis.

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Section: Roundmentioning

confidence: 99%

SAT-Based Security Evaluation for WARP against Linear Cryptanalysis

Shi,

Liu,

2023

IET Information Security

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“…They also applied the division property to find a 20-round integral distinguisher. WARP has also received third-party analysis which mostly focused on differential cryptanalysis [TB21,KY21]. For example, by employing the FBCT framework, Teh and Biryukov [TB21] investigated the security of WARP against boomerang attacks and introduced a 21-round sandwich distinguisher with probability 2 −121.11 building upon which they mounted a key-recovery attack on 24 rounds.…”

Section: Sandwich Distinguishers For Warpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Throwing Boomerangs into Feistel Structures

Hadipour

Nageler²,

Eichlseder³

2022

ToSC

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Automatic tools to search for boomerang distinguishers have seen significant advances over the past few years. However, most previous work has focused on ciphers based on a Substitution Permutation Network (SPN), while analyzing the Feistel structure is of great significance. Boukerrou et al. recently provided a theoretical framework to formulate the boomerang switch over multiple Feistel rounds, but they did not provide an automatic tool to find distinguishers. In this paper, by enhancing the recently proposed method by Hadipour et al., we provide an automatic tool to search for boomerang distinguishers and apply it to block ciphers following the Generalized Feistel Structure (GFS). Applying our tool to a wide range of GFS ciphers, we show that it significantly improves the best previous results on boomerang analysis. In particular, we improve the best previous boomerang distinguishers for 20 and 21 rounds of WARP by a factor of 238.28 and 236.56, respectively. Thanks to he effectiveness of our method, we can extend the boomerang distinguishers of WARP by two rounds and distinguish 23 rounds of this cipher from a random permutation. Applying our method to the internationally-standardized cipher CLEFIA, we achieve a 9-round boomerang distinguisher which improves the best previous boomerang distinguisher by one round. Based on this distinguisher, we build a key-recovery attack on 11 rounds of CLEFIA, which improves the best previous sandwich attack on this cipher by one round. We also apply our method to LBlock, LBlock-s, and TWINE and improve the best previous boomerang distinguisher of these ciphers.

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“…Initially, branch-and-bound based methods were used to construct these relations and various improvements in this approach has been proposed [21]. The major development in this area was application of MILP to construct the optimal differential characteristics [25] [22]. The machine learning based approach has also been used to construct the high probability differential distinguishers [30].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Practical-Quantum Differential Attack on Block Ciphers

Yadav

Kumar

et al. 2023

Preprint

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Differential attack is a basic cryptanalysis method for block ciphers that exploits the high probability relations between the input and output differences. The existing work in quantum differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers is focused on resource estimation to recover the last round subkeys on the basis of relations constructed using classical methods. To find such relations using quantum computing, we propose a method to search the high probability differential and impossible differential characteristics. The method explores all possible input and output difference pairs using superposition of qubits. The proposed method is used to design the quantum circuit to search the differential characteristics for a toy cipher smallGIFT. We execute the quantum circuit on a quantum simulator to get differential and impossible characteristics. These characteristics are validated with the characteristics obtained using branch-and-bound based method. The differential characteristic is used to mount quantum key recovery attack using Grover's search. We provide the estimation of quantum resources to search the differential characteristics of lightweight block cipher GIFT-64 on a quantum computer.

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MILP Based Differential Attack on Round Reduced WARP

Cited by 10 publications

References 15 publications

SAT-Based Security Evaluation for WARP against Linear Cryptanalysis

SAT-Based Security Evaluation for WARP against Linear Cryptanalysis

Throwing Boomerangs into Feistel Structures

A Practical-Quantum Differential Attack on Block Ciphers

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